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In the transition to a market economy, the Russian workforce underwent a wrenching 
period of change, with excess supply of some industrial skills coexisting with reports of 
skills shortages by many enterprises.  This paper uses data from the Russia 
Competitiveness and Investment Climate Survey and related local research to gain 
insights into the changing supply and demand for skills over time, and the potential 
reasons for reported staffing problems and skills shortages, including labor turnover, 
compensation policies and the inhibiting effects of labor regulations. It discusses in-
service training as an enterprise strategy for meeting staffing and skills needs, and 
presents evidence on the distribution, intensity and determinants of in-service training in 
Russia.  It investigates the productivity and wage outcomes of in-service training, and the 
supportive role of training in firms’ research and development (R&D) and innovative 
activities.  A final section concludes with some policy implications of the findings.   
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2005-2006, that is being published as a World Bank report, “Building Skills and Absorptive Capacity in 






















































































































Russia, despite having a highly educated workforce, now faces a looming skills crisis in 
industry.  In the transition to a market economy, the Russian workforce underwent a 
wrenching reallocation of labor across industries and occupations,
2 and many specialized 
and technical skills previously acquired under central planning became partially or fully 
depreciated, and were no longer demanded by industry. Mismatches in the labor market 
became widespread, with sharp shortages of some types of skilled workers coexisting 
with excess supplies of others. The formal education system and the specialized 
vocational and technical training institutions in particular were poorly prepared to operate 
under these new market conditions and to supply the new skills required by the market. 
Employers who used to hoard labor are now increasingly reporting skills shortages as a 
major production constraint, and some are upgrading the skills of their existing workers 
through in-service training programs. 
 
Analyzing these skills issues and developing policies to address them are critically 
important if Russia is to raise labor productivity in industry, improve its international 
competitiveness, and participate more fully in the Knowledge Economy.  Skills shortages 
directly constrain production, and prevent firms from meeting demand and using 
available inputs efficiently with consequences for lower productivity; indirectly, skills 
shortages can inhibit innovation and use of new technologies which are skill-intensive 
activities.  Skills mismatches, between the skills that firms require and what education 
and training institutions supply to the labor market, have implications for the wasteful use 
of scarce public and private resources and, for individuals, sunk investments in their 
human capital that yield low returns and unfavorable labor market outcomes.  What 
policies are appropriate will depend on the proximate causes of skills mismatches, 
whether under-funding or the governance of education and training institutions that 
constrain them from responding to the skills needs of the market; labor regulations that 
inhibit hiring and firing by firms to meet staffing shortfalls or compensation policies that 
prevent some employers from paying competitive wages to attract needed labor; or 
market failures in the training market, such as high turnover of trained workers, that 
inhibit the willingness of employers to invest in training and upgrade worker skills to 
meet their own skills needs. 
 
This paper uses the 2005 Russia Competitiveness and Investment Climate Survey
3 
(henceforth, referred to as ICS) and related local research and information sources to gain 
insights into these issues of skills shortages, skills mismatches and in-service training in 
Russia.  Section II examines the macro trends in the levels and quality of education, the 
effects of economic restructuring on the skills composition of the workforce during the 
                                                 
2 According to К.Sabirianova (2001), over 40 percent of all the employed in Russia changed their 
occupations during the 1991-1998 period and two thirds of them did it within 1991-95.  She termed this 
mass occupational change that took place the "Great Human Capital Reallocation”. 
3 The Russian ICS consists of two parts: the Russian Large and Medium Enterprise Survey (LME) covering 
1000 firms, and the Russian Small Enterprise Survey (SE) covering 300 firms.   3
transition period, the returns to schooling and what these macro trends suggest about 
aggregate supply and demand for skills in the Russian labor market. Section III uses data 
from firm surveys, including the Russia ICS, to characterize the distribution and nature of 
staffing and skills shortages among different groups of manufacturing firms.  These 
micro data are analyzed to gain insights into the potential reasons for reported staffing 
problems and skills shortages, including labor turnover, compensation policies and the 
inhibiting effects of labor regulations. Section IV turns to a discussion of worker training 
as a strategy for enterprises to meet their staffing and skills needs, and presents evidence 
on the distribution, intensity and determinants of in-service training in Russia. Section V 
investigates the productivity and wages outcomes of in-service training, and the 
supportive role of training in firms’ research and development (R&D) and innovative 
activities.  A final section concludes with some policy implications of the findings. 
 
 
II. Macro Skills Trends during the Transition 
 
The evolution of human capital in Russia is closely associated with the transition from a 
centrally-planned economy to a market-oriented one. In the pre-transition period, most of 
Russia’s workforce was concentrated in industry while the service sector was 
underdeveloped. Educational attainment was high but the educational system was 
oriented towards providing narrowly defined technical skills at the expense of more 
general knowledge and skills. Wage inequality was artificially compressed and rates of 
return to higher education were relatively low (in the 1-2 percent range).  
 
This employment structure changed dramatically in 1991. In the first stage of the 
transition (1991-1998), industrial restructuring was accompanied by decreases in 
employment and working hours, unemployment growth, and steep decline in real wages. 
The second stage (1999-2006) developed against the background of a dynamic post-crisis 
recovery, which positively affected all labor market indicators, leading to rising returns to 
education and increasing reports from industry of skills shortages. These changes provide 
the backdrop for the following discussion of the macro trends in human capital 
accumulation.  
 
Stocks of Human Capital 
 
According to (Barro and Lee, 2001), Russia in 2001 had one of the most highly educated 
workforces in the world. For the population aged 25 and over, Russia ranked seventh in 
the Barro-Lee sample of countries with an average of 10.5 years of schooling. On a graph 
comparing the educational attainment and GDP per capita of the Barro-Lee countries, 
Russia is an outlier.  See Figure 1.  It is significantly above the fitted-line in the first 
panel, comparing mean years of educational attainment.  Russia is ahead of other BRIC 
(Brazil, Russia, India and China) and transition countries as well as most OECD 
countries, leading Germany by 0.7 years, Japan by 0.8 years, and the U.K. by 1.1 years; 
only the U.S. is ahead of Russia, and the difference is about 1.8 years of education.  
   4
Figure 1. International Comparisons of Educational Attainment 
 
Russia also has one of the highest shares of population age 25 and over with tertiary 
education.  See the bottom panel of Figure 1.  Over half (57 percent) of the population 
has attained tertiary education, which is 13 percentage points more than in Canada and 
more than twice that in other post-socialist countries where the proportion of the 
population does not exceed 15 percent.  This result is due in part to the very high 
proportion of the population that attended professional and technical colleges (or SSUZ 
in Russian). However, if only attendance at university-level institutions (or VUZ in 
Russian) is considered, Russia with 21 percent still ranks in the top 10 countries, sharing 
9
th and 10
th place honors with Japan.     5
 
Russia thus appears on the surface to be well situated to take advantage of knowledge-
based economic activities requiring a well-educated workforce and a pool of researchers. 
Compared to BRIC and other transition countries, Russia in 2003 had twice as many 
researchers per million of population (3,371) as compared to the Czech Republic, 
Hungary or Poland (averaging about 1,500), and 5 to 10 times more researchers than 
Brazil (344 in 2000) or China (663). On this indicator, Russia is closer to France and 
Germany (with about 3,200) but behind the U.S. and Japan (4,500 to 5,300). It has 
benefited from downsizing in the science sector during the transition so that a significant 
proportion of the workforce has experience in research activities. 
 
Quality of Education 
 
Its educational achievements notwithstanding, Russia fares less well internationally with 
regards to spending on education, with negative implications for the quality of education.  
In Russia, the share of total educational expenditures in GDP (3.7 percent) is lower than 
in developed and other transition countries, but comparable to educational spending in 
the BRIC countries (see Table 1).  
 
Table 1. Expenditures on Educational Institutions, 2002 
 
Expenditure on education per student relative to GDP per capita 




as % of GDP 


















Industrial countries         
  France  6.1  18.3 30.8 35.7 33.2  33.8 
  Germany  5.3  17.0 26.4 21.5 44.5  41.3 
  Japan  4.7  22.5 25.6 35.2 44.0  43.1 
  United Kingdom  5.9 17.8  22.5  n.a. n.a.  40.9 
  United States  7.2 22.2  25.1  n.a. n.a.  56.8 
Transition countries         
  Czech Republic  4.4  12.5 21.9 16.3 40.2  37.6 
  Hungary  5.6  21.0 22.2 60.5 57.0  57.1 
  Poland  6.1 23.1 m  n.a. n.a.  43.2 
BRIC countries         
  Brazil (2001)  4.0 10.9  12.3  n.a. n.a.  134.7 
  India (2001)  4.8 14.6  26.3  n.a. n.a.  91.7 
  Russia (2000)  3.7   9.3  16.9  12.6  34.9  26.5 
   Source:  OECD 2005 
 
Looking at annual expenditures per student relative to GDP per capita, Russian funding 
for education is skewed towards tertiary education. For secondary education, this ratio is 
9.3 percent, comparable in levels to spending in Indonesia, Uruguay and Peru. For   6
university-level education, the ratio is 34.9 percent which is comparable to that of France 
but behind Germany and Japan.   
 
In contrast, the ratio of students to teaching staff in Russian educational and training 
institutions is low internationally.  In primary schools, the ratio is 17 pupils per teacher 
and is close to values typical for most of the developed and transition countries; in 
secondary schools, the ratio is the lowest in the world with 8.5 pupils per teacher; in 
universities, it is 15 which is also lower than in most developed or transition economies. 
Low student-teacher ratios in the face of severe under-funding at lower levels of 
education can be explained by very low pay in the educational sector. In 2004, average 
monthly wage in the education sector was only 62 percent of the average wage in the 
economy as a whole, and 53 percent of the average wage in industry (not controlling for 
individual characteristics). The likely consequences of low relative pay are negative 
selection of faculty into the education sector, diminished incentives, and a lower quality 
of instruction.  
 
Russia’s performance in internationally comparable standardized tests lends some 
support for this conclusion. According to TIMSS (Trends in International Mathematics 
and Science Study), which is administered to 4
th and 8
th grade students, Russian students 
in 2003 had achievement scores in mathematics and science at the 4
th grade level that 
were above the international average, placing Russia at the 10
th and 11
th place among 28 
countries that participated.  However, Russia lagged behind the leaders – Singapore, 
Hong Kong and Taiwan – at this 4
th grade level.  Russia continues to perform well at the 
8
th grade level for student achievement in TIMMS, scoring above the international 
average for the 50 participating countries but now slipping to 14
th and 21
st place 
internationally (see Table 2). 
 
Table 2. Russian Student Achievement Scores in TIMMS and PISA 
 
TIMMS, 8 grade  1995 1999 2003 
International 
mean score  
International 
ranking 
  Mathematics  524  526  508  467  14 out of 50 
  Science  523  529  514  474  21 out of 50 
PISA, 15 years old   2000 2003 
  
  Literacy    462  442  480  32 out of 40 
  Mathematics    478  468  486  29 out of 40 
  Science    460  489  488  24 out of 40 
  Problem solving    -  479  486  28 out of 40 
  Source: OECD data 
 
On PISA (Programme for International Student Assessment), which asseses the quality of 
education for 15 year old students, Russia in 2003 had average literacy scores of 442, 
markedly below the international average score of 480. This put Russia in 32
nd place 
among the 40 countries participating, and some 90-100 points behind the scores received 
by the leaders - Finland, the Republic of Korea and Canada. Russia’s scores on student 
assessments in mathematics, science and problem solving were similarly low, and below   7
the international average.  One explanation for lower scores on PISA is the test’s focus 
(unlike TIMMS) on applied knowledge, which is consistent with the observation that 
Russian schools tend to place greater emphasis on acquisition of encylopedic knowledge 
over problem solving, innovative thinking and creativity (that is, the constructive use of 
knowledge as opposed to its mere accumulation).
4 
 
The inference to be drawn from these test scores is that the quality of lower secondary 
education in Russia is poor, relative to that in other developed and almost all other 
transition countries, and that many students enter the labor market poorly equiped for the 
demands of the work place.  Furthermore, comparing Russia’s test scores on TIMMS and 




How about higher levels of education? The IALS (International Adult Literacy Survey) 
assesses how well equipped adults of different levels of education are for the demands of 
the workplace, including the ability to apply knowledge to real-world situations – a core 
competency that is highly valued by most employers throughout the world.  Russia has 
not participated in IALS so no internationally comparable assessments can be made of 
how well Russian schools prepare students for the world of work, especially at the higher 
levels of education not covered by TIMMS or PISA - including upper secondary, and 
vocational, professional and technical institutes below the university level.  If funding is 
any indication, the quality and work-place relevance of the education and training 
provided by these institutions are also likely to be low, given Russia’s under-funding (by 
international standards) of these institutions (see Table 1). While reforms have taken 
place or are taking place in some regions, many vocational, professional and technical 
                                                 
4 See David Fretwell and Anthony Wheeler (2001), “Russia Secondary Education and Training”, World 
Bank Secondary Education Series. 
Box 1. Reforms to Vocational Education in Russia 
 
The need for reform of the vocational education system in Russia is probably greater than for 
either secondary or higher education. The inheritance of a supply-driven, tightly controlled 
and micromanaged system designed to fit into a planned economy has proved very difficult to 
reshape to fit Russia’s current needs, not least because of stakeholders’ resistance to change.  
With the demise of the majority of SOEs and of the traditional settings in which vocational 
education has operated in the past, gaps between labor market trends and the qualifications 
and training provided by vocational education has widened.  This growing mismatch has 
occurred at the very time rapid technological development and global competition requires a 
more flexible, learning-ready, and skilled workforce.  
 
Key issues for reform include (i) governance, where a large numbers of agencies oversee the 
VET system; (ii) rigid professional standards, which slow adoption of a competency-based 
qualification system; (iii) lack of emphasis on core transferable skills, instead of narrowly 
defined skills; (iv) inadequate funding to finance operations, upgrading of VET infrastructure 
and instructor skills; and (v) consolidation of the fragmented VET system.  
 
Source:  Mary Canning (2005), “The Modernization of Education in Russia”, World Bank.   8
institutions continue to operate along pre-transition supply-driven lines, providing 
without input from employers narrowly specialized skills which do not meet emerging 
market needs (see Box 1).  
 
Restructuring and human capital accumulation 
 
High rates of educational attainment are not simply a legacy from the pre-transition 
period. While demand for higher education fell in the immediate post-reform period, 
enrollments rose again in the mid-1990s and today they exceed the enrollment rates 
prevailing in the late 1980s.  
 
Table 3 presents the educational distributions of the population age 15 years and older 
from the 1989 and 2002 censuses. Over this period, the proportion of persons with 
university-level education (complete and incomplete) increased by 6 percent points while 
that of tertiary-level (SSUZ) professional and technical education rose 8 percentage 
points.  The shares of persons with primary vocational and general secondary education 
remained unchanged. At the lower end of the education scale, the share of those with 
lower secondary education decreased by 3.5 percent points while those with primary or 
less than primary fell by 4 and 5.5 percentage points, respectively. These shifts are even 
more pronounced if only the employed workforce is considered. The 2002 General 
Census suggests that now almost 60 percent of workers have some tertiary education, 
while the share of low-educated workers (lower secondary or less) has now fallen to 
below 7 percent. 
 
Table 3.  Schooling Completion Rates in Russia, 1989 and 2002 
Total Population Aged 15 
years and older 
Employed Population 
Aged 15 years and older 
Highest level of schooling 
attained  
1989 2002 1989 2002 
  Higher complete  11.3  16.2  14.6  23.3 
  Higher incomplete   1.7    3.1   1.3    3.0 
  Tertiary (SSUZ)  19.2  27.5  24.3  35.7 
  Secondary vocational  13.0  12.8  17.8  15.3 
  Upper secondary general  17.9  17.7  20.8  16.2 
  Lower secondary general  17.5  13.9  13.5    5.6 
  Primary  12.9    7.8   6.7    0.9 
  Preprimary    6.5    1.0   1.1    0.1 
Total  100 100 100 100 
  Source: Rossstat, various years. 
 
How much of the increase in educational attainment of the workforce was the result of 
changes in the industrial and occupational composition of employment that accompanied 
restructuring, and how much to education upgrading within industries and occupations? 
A decomposition of the effects of industrial and occupational changes,
5 done separately 
for 1992 to 1996 and for 1997 to 2002, suggests the following results:   
                                                 
5 A shift-share approach is used to decompose changes over time in educational attainment attributable to 
different components – one that measures the results of shifts in the industry and occupational composition 
of employment, holding education constant; another that measures the contribution of rising education,   9
 
•  In both periods, the largest contribution to rising educational attainment of the 
workforce came from educational upgrading within industries and occupations 
rather than their reallocation across industries and occupations. 
 
•  In the initial 1992-1996 period, about a quarter of all improvements in educational 
attainment was associated with shifts between industries, with inter-industry shifts 
having a slightly positive effect on demand for workers with higher education, 
and stronger effects for those with secondary education and tertiary-level 
professional and technical training. Inter-occupation shifts contributed 18.5 
percent, and favored the least educated group of workers. 
 
•  In the more recent 1997-2002 period, virtually all the rising educational 
attainment came from educational upgrading within industries and occupations.  
The contribution of shifts across industries decreased to 2.6 percent, while that of 
inter-occupational shifts nearly halved to 10.6 percent. 
 
This decomposition highlights the fact that while changes in the structure of industry and 
occupations contributed modestly to educational upgrading of the workforce in the early 
1990s, most of the subsequent educational upgrading proceeded independently of 
restructuring. That this educational upgrading took place across the board, and within all 
industries and occupations, suggests the presence of a strong skill-biased change process, 
in technological change and in the transformation of organizational and institutional 
arrangements in the workplace. The demand for education is likely to increase in such an 
environment of change, given the comparative advantage that educated workers have in 
implementing new technology or more generally in responding to disequilibria.
6 
 
Returns to Education 
 
The rising returns to education in Russia help explain why demand for education was so 
strong over the transition period. Rates of return, estimated based on Mincer-type wage 
equations, suggest that private returns to an extra year of schooling prior to the transition 
were in the range of 2 to 3 percent, reflecting wage compression resulting from the 
administratively-set ‘wage grid’ system. The demise of centralized wage-setting led to a 
rapid increase in the education premium - returns to an extra year of education rose to 
about 7 to 8 percent in the first five years of transition, and then by an additional 2 to 3 
percent in the later period, stabilizing at 8 to 10 percent by 2000-2002 (see Figure 2).   
 
Similar patterns of post-reform rising returns to education can be observed in other 
former socialist countries.  Table 4 reports returns to education estimated by Fleisher, 
                                                                                                                                                 
holding industry and occupation mix constant; and a third inter-action term.  The 1992-1997 decomposition 
uses 6 education, 50 occupations and 15 industry groups, while the 1997-2002 decomposition relies on 7 
education, 32 occupations and 19 industrial groups. 
6 See Theodore Schultz (1975), “The value of the ability to deal with disequilibria”; Anne Bartel and Frank 
Lichtenberg (1983), “The comparative advantage of educated workers in implementing new technology”, 
and Tan (2005), “The skills challenge of new technology”.   10








1985 1990 1991 1993 1994 1995 1996 1996 1998 2000 2002 2003
S&G S&G Brainerd Brainerd Brainerd S&N S&N S&G S&G S&G S&G NOBUS
Sabirinova and Wang (2004) for several transition countries, separately for 3 periods: 
pre-reform, early reform and late reform. Rates of return to education almost doubled 
between the pre-reform and late reform period for many CIS countries, while those in 
Russia more than doubled. For China, increases in the returns to schooling were even 
more dramatic. Because it had much lower pre-reform rates of return of about 1.5 
percent, returns to schooling had quadrupled by the late reform period.  
 



















Source: Pop-Eleches, Gimpelson, and Tesluk (2005) 
 













China 1979  0.015  0.025  0.061 
Czech Republic  1991  0.039 0.070  0.083 
Estonia 1992  0.025  0.076  Na 
Hungary 1990  0.067  0.074  0.098 
Poland 1990  0.046  0.067  0.072 
Romania 1992  na  0.046  0.056 
Russia 1992  0.039  0.075  0.092 
Slovak Republic  1991  0.038  0.061  0.097 
Slovenia 1991  0.043  0.063  0.070 
Ukraine 1992  0.040  na  0.055 
  Source:  Fleisher, Sabirianova, and Wang (2004) 
 
This phenomenon of rising returns to schooling is not unique to transition economies.  
Rates of return to schooling have risen in many countries, in Brazil over the past two 






































































Returns to education 95% CI 95% CI
became increasingly integrated into global markets.
7 In these countries, as in the 
transition economies, economic change brought about by opening up economies to global 
trade or moving from a centrally-planned to a market economy created strong demand for 
(and rising returns to) more educated and skilled workers. 
 
Figure 3. Returns to Education by Level of Schooling Attainment 
Source: NOBUS, 2003 
 
When returns are differentiated by level of education, specialized training tends to yield 
lower payoffs than obtaining more general education. Figure 3 shows, separately for 
                                                 
7 For example, see Blom, Holm-Nielsen and Verner, “Education, Earnings and Inequality in Brazil: 1982-
1998”, World Bank, and Riboud, Tan and Savchenko (2006), “Globalization and Education and Training in 
South Asia”, forthcoming.   12
males and females, the wage increments to each level of education in excess of complete 
secondary education.  Getting vocational training increases wages of secondary school 
graduates by about 5 percent; tertiary-level professional and technical colleges (SSUZ) 
which provide training in specific skills areas yield wage increases of 13 percent for 
males and 20 percent for females. University educated males earn 50 percent more than 
those who complete secondary school, while the wage premium for females is about 70 
percent. These high returns to university-level education explain why enrollment rates in 
higher education have risen over the transition.  And the fact that schooling returns have 
stayed high despite the increasing supply of educated workers indicates that the demand 
for higher education is very strong, and exceeds supply.   
 
 
III. Micro Evidence on Skills Constraints and Labor Shortages 
 
The previous section highlighted several macro skills trends – an increased supply of 
educated workers, concerns about quality and possible deterioration in the quality and 
relevance of education and training received; and strong demand for education in excess 
of available supply as reflected in continued high returns to schooling in the face of rising 
school enrollments. Against that backdrop, this section turns to micro evidence from firm 
surveys, including the Russia Competitiveness and Investment Climate Survey, to gain 
insights into the increasing frequency of employer complaints about labor and skills 
shortages, whether these concerns are justified, which firms are most affected by skills 
shortages, and what factors if any constrain enterprises from responding to these 
perceived skills shortages. 
 
Firms’ Perceptions of Labor and Skills Shortages 
 
Respondents to the Russia ICS ranked “Lack of skilled and qualified workforce” as the 
number 2 investment climate constraint to enterprise growth and development (number 1 
constraint being taxation). Small enterprises with less than a 100 employees (the SE 
sample) also ranked this skills constraint as major or severe, though not as highly as 
regulation or access and cost of finance (see Figure 4).
8     
 
This skills constraint is not new, but has been growing over time with the transition from 
a planned to a market economy and with rapid economic growth since the late 1990s.  
Time series data from the quarterly Russia Economic Barometer (REB) surveys provide 
insights into how over- or under-staffing in enterprises has changed over the last two 
decades.  Prior to the 1998 financial crisis, the proportion of firms reporting that they 
were over-staffed relative to expected output over the coming year was high – in 1997, 38 
percent of firms noted that they had redundant personnel. The strong recovery in 
industrial output that started after 1998 brought the proportion of overstaffed firms down 
to the level of under 15 percent (see Figure 5).   
                                                 
8 In addition to ranking each constraint on a scale of 1 to 5, with 5 being a severe constraint, enterprises in 
the LME and SE surveys were also asked to identify the most severe constraint from among the previous 
list.  This alternative ranking yielded broadly similar findings, with lack of a qualified workforce being 
ranked number 3 by medium and large enterprises and number 2 by small enterprises.   13
 
Figure 4. Proportion of Enterprise Ranking Workforce Skills 
As Major or Severe Investment Climate Constraints 
 
  Source: Russia LME and SE Surveys, 2005. 
 




























Proportion of firms overstaffed against expected output, %
Proportion of firms understaffed against expected output, %
 
  Source: REB 
 
Meanwhile, the problem of understaffing began to emerge. The proportion of firms 
reporting that existing personnel was not sufficient to meet expected demand started to 
grow after 1998, and by 2004, almost every fourth firm reported under-staffing against 
expected output.  The shift from overstaffing to labor shortage is consistent with labor 
utilization rates – that grew from around 70 percent in the mid-1990s to 90 percent in 
2005, indicating almost full utilization of the workforce – and with the 1.5 times increase 
in output over the 1999-2005 period against a slight decrease in employment in the 
corporate sector. 
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In the 2005 Russia ICS, about 60 percent of surveyed managers rated their current 
staffing levels as “optimal” relative to current output. Of the remaining enterprises, 27 
percent felt that they were “under-staffed” and 13 percent as “over-staffed”.  On average, 
under-staffed firms were short by 17 percent of personnel while over-staffed firms had 15 
percent more workers than they currently needed. This means that a sizeable fraction of 
Russian enterprises had difficulties adjusting the size of their workforce to staffing levels 
dictated by their current output.  
      
Table 5. Characteristics of Firms by Optimality of Staffing Levels 
  Source:  Russia LME Survey, 2005 
 
Table 5 reports the distribution of staffing levels for the Russia ICS sample according to 
several firm characteristics.  The probability and levels of under-staffing are highest for 
Optimal 
Staffing  Under-staffed Over-staffed 
Firm Characteristics 








Industry        
  Metallurgy  56.5  29.4  19.5  14.1  13.5 
  Chemicals  52.4  25.0  8.9  22.6  13.7 
  Machinery  57.1  29.6  17.9  13.3  15.3 
  Wood processing  60.7  25.0  11.6  14.3  11.0 
  Textiles  41.9  50.5  22.6  7.5  12.3 
  Food  74.3  15.5  13.2  10.2  16.8 
Firm size        
  Less than 250  62.9  29.0  22.0  8.1  13.6 
  251-500  58.4  28.2  15.2  13.3  16.8 
  501-1000  61.4  22.8  8.6  15.8  15.0 
  More than 1000  51.1  25.2  11.7  23.8  13.2 
Exporter         
  No  62.2  27.6  20.0  10.2  14.4 
  Yes  56.9  26.9  13.4  16.2  14.7 
R&D spending        
  No  63.6  26.8  16.9  9.6  14.4 
  Yes  56.3  27.7  17.1  16.0  14.7 
New firm (after 1992)          
  No  60.0  26.5  16.5  13.6  14.6 
  Yes  59.1  30.2  18.6  10.7  14.8 
Foreign ownership         
  No  61.8  26.8  16.9  11.5  14.3 
 Yes  53.3  29.0  17.3  17.8  15.3 
Government Control         
  No  61.0  26.7  14.9  12.3  14.5 
  Yes  56.7  28.7  21.8  14.5  14.8 
Competitiveness        
  High  60.6  24.8  11.6  14.7  15.6 
  Medium  61.2  26.9  15.6  11.9  14.7 
  Low  47.9  35.0  25.0  17.1  14.7   15
firms operating in the textile industry. In this sector, over 50 percent of all surveyed firms 
reported staffing below the optimal level, with the staffing gap averaging 22.6 percent 
relative to desired levels. New firms established in or after 1992, small enterprises with 
less than 250 employees, firms operating in the metallurgy and machine-building sectors, 
and government-controlled firms (with more than 25 percent public ownership) are also 
more likely to report understaffing. Over-staffing is more prevalent among large firms 
(with over 1,000 employees) and firms in the chemicals sector. 
 
Staffing levels are also related to how firms rank their level of competitiveness. Firms 
rating themselves as having medium to high levels of competitiveness are more likely to 
report having optimal staffing levels (60-61 percent), and less likely to report either 
under-staffing (25-27 percent) or over-staffing (12-15 percent). On the other hand, firms 
that classify themselves as having “low” competitiveness are less likely to have optimal 
staffing levels (48 percent) and more likely to be under-staffed (35 percent) or over-
staffed (17 percent). Whatever the factors that constrain under-staffed firms from 
employing the personnel they need, or over-staffed firms from discharging redundant 
staff, non-optimal staffing levels can adversely affect firms’ perceptions of their level of 
competitiveness.  
 
Table 6. Under-Staffing of Different Skills Groups 
 
Classification of Enterprises  Firms report under-staffing in different skills categories 
Skills & qualifications of workforce 







     Yes  51.1  51.8 68.4  53.8  60.3 
     No  40.1  38.0 40.1  25.5  38.0 
Overall staffing in the firm is:           
     Optimal  3.0  11.8  0.7  37.0  4.9 
     Under-staffed  8.1  37.0  4.4  95.6  29.3 
     Over-staffed  3.9  14.8  2.3  42.2  6.3 
Total 4.5  19.1  1.9  53.6  11.7 
   Source:   Russia LME Survey, 2005. 
 
Enterprises are concerned not only with overall staffing levels but also with having the 
desired skills mix. This is borne out by which firms report under-staffing in several 
occupational groups – managers, professionals, other white collar employees, skilled 
workers and unskilled workers. Table 6 shows that firms which rank “skills and 
qualifications of the workforce” as a major or severe constraint are also more likely to 
report under-staffing in the different skills groups, as compared to those that do not rank 
skills constraints highly. The bottom panel of Table 6 cross-classifies under-staffing in 
different skills groups by whether firms describe themselves as being overall staffed 
optimally, under-staffed or over-staffed.  As might be expected, firms that have less-than-
optimal staffing levels are more likely than other firms to report under-staffing in all 
skills categories, especially skilled workers (95 percent) and professionals (37 percent). It 
is interesting that firms with optimal or more-than-optimal staffing levels also report 
having skills shortages in the same two skills categories. Specific skills shortages 
especially of professional and skilled workers can coexist with overall optimal or over-
staffing at the level of the enterprise.   16
Table 7.  Correlation of skills as a major or severe 
constraint and the degree of difficulty searching for 
and hiring different skill groups 
Dependent variable: 
Probability of skills being 
major or severe constraint 
Degree of difficulty searching 
for and hiring:   Coefficient z-statistic 
   Managers      0.134***  (3.69) 
   Professionals     0.234***  (6.15) 
   Other white collar employees  0.065    (1.11) 
   Skilled worker     0.443***  (11.04) 
   Unskilled worker     0.140***  (3.16) 
Source:  Russia LME Survey, 2005. 
Notes:    Coefficients are estimated by probit regression analysis  
               separately for each skill group. 
 
Firms’ ranking of skills as a production constraint are supported by the degree of 
difficulty they experience filling specific skills job vacancies.  Table 7 reports the 
correlations between the 
probability that an enterprise 
reports skills as a major or 
severe constraint and its 
ranking of the difficulty (scale 
of 1 to 5) in searching for and 
hiring different skills groups. 
The correlations are all positive 
and statistically significant, 
except for “other white collar 
employees”. They also suggest 
that enterprise perceptions of 
skills being a major or severe 
constraint are driven largely by 
shortages of skilled workers 
(correlation of 0.443) and of 
professionals (0.234). 
 
The extent to which skills shortages are a problem varies across units within firms.   
Figure 6 graphs the percent of firms that ranked several key issues as being a major 
problem by unit within the firm – operating (or production), economic (marketing, 
strategy), research and development (R&D), and human resources.  Most firms identified 
two major problems – lack of technological capacity, and lack of skilled qualified 
workers – both of which are concentrated in operating units, that is, on production lines.  
A much smaller fraction of firms reported these as major problems in the economic, 
research and development (R&D) or human resources (HR) units.   
 




























Table 8. Key reasons for under-staffing by 
enterprises reporting less than optimal staffing 
Reasons for Under-Staffing  % firms 
  High hiring costs  2.2 
  Lack of workers with needed skills in the local 
  labor market 
72.2 
  High competition for workers in local market  23.0 
  Expected decline in demand for output  4.8 
  High labor turnover  30.0 
  Adverse working conditions  18.5 
  Low wages compared to other firms  41.1 
  Other reasons  8.5 
Source:  Russia LME Survey, 2005. 
Note:      Figures do not add to 100 % because respondents could 
               select 3 key reasons for under-staffing.  
 
Source: Russia LME Survey, 2005. 
 
Firms experiencing skills shortages tend to cite a number of reasons for under-staffing 
(see Table 8). The four most commonly listed reasons by frequency of citation are:  lack 
of workers with needed skills in 
the local labor market (72 
percent), paying low wages 
compared to other firms (41 
percent), high labor turnover (30 
percent), and high competition for 
workers in the local labor market 
(23 percent).  These reasons are 
consistent with an inadequate 
supply of workers with relevant 
job skills in the local labor market 
(already discussed in Section II), 
high rates of labor turnover, and 
payment of non-competitive 
wages and salaries.  These factors 
are discussed further below, together with the potential role of labor legislation as a 
constraint on firms’ ability to meet desired staff levels and skills mix.  In Brazil and 
India, labor legislation was identified as an important constraint on staffing flexibility 
(see Box 2). This was not the case in Russia, where most managers did not rank labor 





Labor turnover and skills shortages 
 
Labor turnover in Russian firms has been higher than in other former Socialist countries 
during its transition to a market economy. In 2004, the average rate of new hires was 
Box 2. Brazilian labor legislation hinders workforce flexibility 
 
The Brazilian Investment Climate Assessment (ICA) (2006) highlights the significant 
impacts that rigid labor laws have on the ability of firms to flexibly adjust their workforce 
and skill mix. 80 percent of firms want to change the size of their workforce.  Of the 68 
percent that wish to hire more workers, 81 percent report that labor regulations constrain 
them from doing so, more so than sales growth or union pressure. Regulations restricting 
firing are particularly onerous for smaller firms, and 68 percent cite labor regulations as a 
barrier to employment reductions versus 27 percent of large firms.  The ICA indicates that 
firms citing labor laws as a major constraint tend to respond by resorting to hiring informal 
sector workers under short-term labor contracts.  It also finds evidence that rigid labor 
legislation may affect technology intensive firms disproportionately by making it more 
difficult for such firms to meet their demand for highly skilled labor. 
 






























% Impact of hires on quality of workforce, 1996-2005
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 Impact of separations on quality of workforce, 1996-2005
Separated have higher skills Separated have same skills
Separated have lower skills
Source: REB 
about 29 percent, while the job separation rate was 31 percent, giving the Russian 
economy as a whole a gross labor turnover rate of about 60 percent.  These turnover 
indicators are even higher if only industry is considered, with hiring, separation and gross 
turnover rates of 30, 35 and 65 percent, respectively (Rossstat, 2006).   
 
  Figure 7. Labor Turnover and Skills Mix 
These high rates of labor 
turnover were not neutral with 
respect to skills. Managers 
surveyed in the Russia 
Economic Barometer (REB) 
were asked to compare the 
skills mix of those that were 
either newly hired or 
separated to those that 
remained. Throughout the 
1996-2005 period, more than 
a third of all managers 
reported deteriorating quality 
of their work force, about half 
reported no change in quality, 
and one tenth reported some 
improvements in quality due 
to labor turnover.  
 
Figure 7 suggests that it was 
the low quality of newly hired 
workers rather than the high 
quality of separations that was 
responsible for the reported 
deterioration in workforce 
quality. Almost half of the 
firms hired workers with 
lower quality skills (top panel 
of the figures) while only 10 
percent of firms improved 
workforce quality by hiring 
more skilled workers. On the 
other hand, roughly equal 
proportions of firms improved 
workforce quality as suffered 
quality decreases through job 
separations (top panel).  The net outcome, at least for one segment of these firms 
surveyed, is that the overall quality of their workforce fell. 
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Compensation Policies and Skills Shortages 
 
Respondents to the Russia ICS listed non-competitive wages as one reason for their being 
under-staffed. If true, non-competitive wages may account for the inability of firms 
experiencing labor or skills shortages to either retain their skilled workers or to hire 
equally or more skilled workers from the open labor market, as the REB data noted. 
Firms may not offer competitive wages if they have below average performance and 
profitability, that is, are unable to pay high enough wages to retain their most skilled 
workers or to fill vacant positions with the skilled labor that they need.  
 
There is evidence that under-staffing may be the outcome of low efficiency firms being 
unable to pay competitive wages.  Gimpelson (2004) used data from a survey of 300 
large and medium size firms in Russia to investigate whether skills shortages were driven 
by supply or by demand-side constraints, and if so, what were enterprises doing to 
respond to reported skills shortfalls.
9  The analysis suggested that under-staffed firms had 
levels of labor productivity, profitability and average wages that were lower than those in 
both optimally-staffed and over-staffed firms.  Furthermore, if low efficiency firms (those 
with low labor productivity, profitability or wages) declared that they had labor or skills 
shortages, they were more likely to use workers with mass (generic) skills supplied by the 
traditional vocational education system. In contrast, efficient firms were more likely to 
search for workers with specific or unique skills whose supply is limited.  
 




















Optimal 213.5  1.05  0.11  6.246  -0.53 
Under-staffed 171.4  0.88  0.08  5.620  -1.05 
Over-staffed 179.8  0.90  0.10  6.295  -4.06 
  Source:  Russia LME Survey, 2005 
 
 
A similar pattern of reported staffing levels and firm performance emerges in the 2005 
Russia ICS, which includes a much larger sample of industrial enterprises.  Table 9 
compares firms differing in optimality of staffing by various performance indicators, 
including value-added per worker, labor productivity relative to the industry average, 
2004 profitability, average monthly wage in 2004, and rate of job creation over the past 
year.  Compared to the other groups, under-staffed firms fare the worst in all these 
performance indicators. Though under-staffed, they keep losing employment and show 
negative net employment change over the past year. Over-staffed firms, on the other 
                                                 
9  See Vladimir Gimpelson (2004), “Qualifications and Skill Deficiency in the Labor Market:  Lack of 
Supply, Demand Constraints, or False Signals of Employers?”  The survey, conducted jointly by HSE and 
the Russian Public Opinion Research Center (now Levada-Center), surveyed 304 industrial enterprises 
located in 30 regions of Russia in 2003, with personnel managers as respondents   20
hand, are in a slightly better economic shape and show significant (and needed) 
downsizing over the past year. The best performance in terms of labor productivity and 
profitability is put in by firms having optimal staffing levels. They pay wages comparable 
to those paid by over-staffed firms, wages that are significantly above those paid by 
under-staffed and low productivity firms. 
 
Labor Legislation and Skills Shortages 
 
Russian enterprises may also be constrained from meeting reported skills shortages by 
employment protection legislation (henceforth EPL). There is an emerging literature 
suggesting that overly strict EPL can negatively affect hiring and firing, stifle job creation 
and lead to higher unemployment.  Labor legislation – regarding minimum wages, social 
benefits and guarantees, employment contracts, and layoff regulations – can change the 
costs of labor that employers face and, if strictly enforced, inhibit incentives to hire new 
workers or discharge redundant ones even when warranted by labor demand. 
 
On the World Bank’s (Doing Business, 2006) EPL scale, Russia is not among countries 
with the most stringent EPL.  On rigidity of employment, Russia gets a score of 30 which 
is comparable to China but significantly lower than either Brazil or India (they had scores 
of 56 and 62, respectively).  See Figure 8.  Russia’s index of employment rigidity is 
closer to the average for the OECD as a whole, and lower than in most other transition 
countries (pink bars) except for the Czech Republic, which has a lower score than Russia. 
According to this source, firing costs in Russia measured in weeks of wages (as 
compensation for discharge) are also significantly lower than for other BRIC countries 
(highlighted in darker bars).    
 









































Source: Doing Business, 2006
These indices may understate the extent to which EPL in Russia may constrain the 
staffing decisions of employers. Until 2002, employment in Russia was regulated by the 
Code of Laws on Labor (KZOT); reforms to the Labor Code in 2001 eliminated many   21
contradictory and obsolete requirements, but left the EPL part of the Code relatively 
unchanged.
10  The major positive change was in abolishing trade unions’ veto power on 
mass lay-offs.  The new code required employers to hire employees on standard open-
ended contracts with full-time working week, and restricted the use of fixed-term 
employment contracts to specific cases (which stimulated employers to expand use of 
temporary contracts under these exclusions).  In spring 2004, the Supreme Court ruled 
against the more liberal interpretation of this part of the EPL, and issued directives that 
fixed-term contracts signed illegitimately must be treated as open-ended.   
 
However, EPL regulations are poorly and selectively enforced, so that their impacts on 
staffing flexibility may vary across different firms.
11  The actual “rule of law” is selective 
and varies across regions, sectors, old and new firms, and also across various segments of 
the EPL.
12  In large and mostly unionized firms (accounting for roughly two-thirds of 
total employment in Russia), the EPL is more strictly enforced while they are barely 
binding in small firms. Instead of reducing uncertainty, the EPL (through non-
enforcement) increases it and differentiates firms according to their mandatory labor 
costs.  Firms that enjoy discretion in applying the EPL may avoid paying severance pay 
to its workers.  Other firms that abide by the rules – typically large and medium size 
firms – avoid creating new jobs and keep a low wage policy, and many rely on small 
firms as flexible suppliers of labor (see Box 3).  
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Source: Russia LME Survey, 2005 
                                                 
10 The Russian Labor Code, originally adopted in 1971, was in force throughout the 1990s though with 
multiple partial amendments. Having been born within the central planning system, it had little to do with 
the market economy. Under the law, trade unions enjoyed veto power over layoffs and even if they did not 
object, the costs to employers of discharging redundant personnel were high.  In addition, employers were 
required under this legislation to fund a variety of social benefits and guarantees for employees. 
11 In a recent World Bank study, Rutkovsky and Scarpetta (2005) argue that despite strict EPLs, flexible 
enforcement of stringent EPL rules provide CIS countries with considerable labor market flexibility. 
12 For example, regulations pertaining to layoffs are enforced better than regulations on overtime work.    22
Not surprisingly, managers in the Russia ICS do not rank EPL highly as a production 
constraint as compared to the shortage of skilled labor.
13  Nevertheless, about 17 percent 
of respondents ranked it as a notable constraint. In a separate question on labor 
regulations, only 40 percent of respondents believed that labor regulations do not create 
major problems for their enterprise (see Figure 9).  One fifth reported that rules on hiring 
foreign labor created serious difficulties, 19 percent pointed to hiring and firing rules and 
15 percent stressed the problems of working time regulations. Firms that were over-
staffed tended more frequently (than other firms) to select hiring and firing rules, working 
time regulations, and rules on timing of wage payments as the most constraining among 
all labor regulations. On the other hand, firms with under-staffing tended to stress 
minimum wage rules, and rules governing the hiring of foreign workers as creating 
problems for them. Finally, though the use of short-term contracts is restricted by labor 






                                                 
13 There are simple and quasi-legal ways to deal with EPL constraints and turn labor-management relations 
into a quasi “employment-at-will” practice. First, employers can pressure workers to quit voluntarily. 
Second, there are informal practices of asking workers to submit an application to quit voluntarily at the job 
application point. This allows managers to date the application and initiate a “voluntary” quit at any 
moment and at no costs. These (and some other) informal practices can result in high labor turnover driven 
by quits with almost no lay-offs. 
Box 3. Improving the Labor Code in Russia 
 
The weak enforcement of the Labor Code has not been a major factor in preventing labor 
deployment in Russia during the transition. However, there have been trade-offs in 
promoting informalization of the labor market (through its avoidance), lower worker 
productivity, and reduced worker welfare (for example, low wages, and growth of in-kind 
substitutes and wage arrears).  What can be done? The enforcement of restrictive law is not 
the solution. Rather, reducing excessive restrictions and increasing enforcement should be 
the focus of future efforts. The new Labor Code provides some improvements but more 
needs to be done, including providing more freedom to employers in deploying their work 
force as have been provided their counterparts in the OECD.   
 
Areas for consideration include:  (i) moving to a flexible labor code that is fully enforced, 
thereby reducing the distortions and distributional effects created by partial enforcement; 
(ii) reducing excessive rigidity in the Labor Code, including on work hours and fixed-term 
contracting; (iii) continuing to increase the minimum wage, which is not adversely binding 
on employment, but would reduce poverty among low-wage workers; (iv) reducing the 
influence of tariff in wage-setting: and (v) promoting the development of institutions to 
allow worker voice, improve work conditions, enforce contracts, and resolve disputes, 
thereby raising worker productivity. 
 
Source:  World Bank (2003), “The Russian Labor Market: Moving from Crisis to Recovery”, a co-
publication of World Bank and Izdatelstvo Ves Mir.   23
 
Table 10.  EPL as a Constraint on Hiring Skilled Labor 
 
Dependent variable:  Difficulty in search and hiring of labor 
 Professionals Skilled  workers 
EPL index  .108  .094  - 
 (3.03)***  (2.66)***  - 
EPL is not a constraint  -  -  -.306 
 -  -  (-3.94)*** 
Log(wages) -.093  -.199  -.197 
 (-1.69)*  (-3.66)***  (-3.63)*** 
Government controlled  .218  .021  .023 
 (2.06)**  (0.20)  (0.21) 
Foreign owned   -.153  -.036  -.042 
 (-1.33)  (-0.32)  (-0.37) 
Small firm (<250 employees)  -.301  -.166  -.162 
 (-3.84)***  (-2.17)**  (-2.11)** 
R&D spending indicator  .208  .044  .033 
 (2.64)***  (0.56)  (0.42) 
New Firm (after 1992)  .078  -.115  -.122 
 (0.83)  (-1.25)  (-1.32) 
Number of observations  896  898  898 
Likelihood Ratio (chi2)  123.85  181.13  189.56 
  Source:  Russia LME Survey, 2005 
  Notes:    industry and regional control variables included.  Z-values in parentheses and * statistically  
                significant at 10 %, ** significant at 5 % and *** significant at 1%. 
                EPL index is the sum of rankings for EPL related difficulties. 
 
 
Labor adjustment costs induced by the EPL are likely to make it more difficult for firms 
to search for and hire needed skilled workers. Table 10 reports estimates from an ordered 
probit model in which the 5-score index of difficulty (ranking of 1 to 5 where 5 is 
maximum difficulty) searching for and hiring skilled labor is regressed on an index of 
EPL as a constraint (sum of different EPL components that respondents indicate as 
problematic), wage levels in the firm (to test the Gimpelson hypothesis), and different 
enterprise characteristics that might shape skills demand. The model is estimated 
separately for professionals and for skilled workers, the two groups in greatest demand. 
The results provide evidence that the EPL index is positively associated with the actual 
difficulties firms experience in searching for and hiring professionals and skilled workers. 
The higher the sum of EPL rankings as a constraint, the more severely firms report search 
and hiring difficulties for both professionals and skilled workers. Firms able to 
circumvent EPL, on the other hand, are less likely to rank search and hiring of skilled 
labor as a problem. The results in Table 10 also confirm the hypothesis that firms paying 
low non-competitive wages are also more likely to report difficulties in search and hiring 
of skilled labor.    
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IV. In-Service Training in Russian Enterprises 
 
One possible solution to skills shortages in the local labor market is for employers to train 
or upgrade the skills of its existing workforce. The hiring versus retraining option is 
discussed by Lazareva, Denisova, and Tsukhlo (2006), based upon a survey of 1,000 
industrial enterprises in 2004.
14  In their survey, 56 percent of firms noted that retraining 
of existing workers is the most efficient way to meet skills shortages, 35 percent state that 
hiring from the external market is preferable, and 25 percent prefer agreements with 
education and training institutions to provide trained personnel.   
 
This section focuses on the in-service training and skills upgrading practices of Russian 
manufacturing firms. The Russia ICS Survey asked employers detailed questions about 
their workforce and training practices: do enterprises provide any formal in-service 
training, whether training is from in-house or from external sources, what is the duration 
of training, and number of employees trained in five broad occupation categories?  These 
data, together with information on different enterprise attributes and production, allow us 
to examine not only which Russian employers provide in-service training to their 
workforce, how much, who they train, where they get training but also what are the 
productivity and wage outcomes of such training investments.  Subsequently, the section 
turns to the issue of how training can complement and support the R&D and innovative 
activities of enterprises. 
 
Overview of In-Service Training 
 
Simple tabulations suggest that about 70 percent of manufacturing enterprises in the LME 
sample provide employees with in-service training. This figure is not comparable to other 
countries because the LME survey, by design, focuses on medium and large firms with 
over 100 employees, and larger firms tend on average to train more than small ones. The 
BEEPS and ICS surveys, by contrast, tend to include a higher proportion of smaller 
firms. To compare the incidence of training in Russia to that of OECD and selected 
comparator developing countries, we adopt a common weighting scheme based 
(arbitrarily) on the size distribution of firms in the India ICS survey.
15 The weighted 
incidence of formal in-service training is calculated for the pooled LME and SE samples 
from Russia, and for 16 other comparator countries: 6 from the OECD, 3 from East Asia, 
2 from South Asia, 2 from Latin America, and 3 from Eastern Europe.
16   
 
Figure 10 shows estimates of training incidence in OECD countries and in four regions, 
and separately for the 17 countries used to calculate regional averages.  The selected 
                                                 
14 Olga Lazareva, Irina Denisova, and Serguey Tsukhlo (2006), “Hiring or Retraining:  Russian Firms’ 
Experience”, HSE Working paper WP3/2006/11, 2006. 
15 The size distribution of micro (15 or fewer workers), small (16-100 workers), medium (101-250 workers) 
and large firms (over 250 workers) in India is 40, 44, 7 and 8 percent; the corresponding size distribution 
for the pooled LME and SE surveys in Russia are 12, 16, 29 and 43 percent 
16 The 17 countries clustered by region include Germany, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, South Korea and Spain 
(OECD), China, Malaysia and Thailand (East Asia), India and Sri Lanka (South Asia), Brazil and Chile 
(Latin America), Bulgaria, Lithuania, Serbia and Russia (Eastern Europe).   25
comparator countries in East Asia and Latin America have higher training incidence than 
the transition economies in Eastern Europe and OECD countries, with South Asia 
especially far behind. How does training incidence in Russia compare with its BRIC 
developing country competitors – Brazil, India, and China?  Russia, at 58 percent training 
incidence, trails behind China (92 percent) and Brazil (59 percent), but it is way ahead of 
India (17 percent). 
 
Figure 10. Incidence of Formal In-Service Training:  
OECD, Regional and Country Means 
 
     Source:  BEEPS, ICS Data base, and pooled Russia LME and SE Surveys 
 
However, these simple training incidence estimates and cross-national comparisons are 
misleading because Russian firms that train provide training to very few of their 
employees. The Russia ICS survey elicited data about which skills groups received in-
service training and, more importantly, how many were trained.  Conditional on the firm 
providing training, the survey suggests that managers, professionals and skilled workers 
are the three skills groups most likely to benefit from in-service training, which is 
consistent with the kinds of skills shortages reported by firms.  On average, only 10-11 
percent of managers and professionals and about 8 percent of skilled workers receive 
formal training.  
 
These figures are extremely low internationally, and suggest that in-service training 
practices are not firmly entrenched among Russian firms.  In Malaysia, a fast growing 
East Asian country that also ranked skills shortages highly
17, a World Bank study (1997) 
estimated that 24 percent of managers, 32 percent of professionals and technicians, and 
                                                 
17 In the Malaysian ICS survey, employers ranked the skills and education of the workforce as the number 
one “severe” or “very severe” investment climate constraint. See World Bank (2004), “Malaysia: Firm 
Competitiveness, Investment Climate and Growth”. 
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between 13 and 16 percent of production workers received formal in-service training. 
Thus, while many more Russian firms train, they provide training to a relatively small 
percent of their workforce as compared to their fast growing counterparts in East Asia. 
 
Table 11 provides cross-nationally comparable estimates of the shares of skilled and 
unskilled workers receiving formal training
18, conditional on the enterprise providing in-
service training. Several groups of 
countries are represented – BRIC 
excluding India, transition economies, 
OECD countries and selected 
developing countries.  Russia stands 
out among the BRIC group in the very 
small share of its workforce trained 
within the firm – 7.7 and 1.4 percent of 
skilled and unskilled workers – as 
compared to Brazil (53 and 45 percent) 
and China (44 and 28 percent), both of 
which also report higher incidence of 
in-service training than Russia. 
 
The share of Russian workers trained 
in in-service programs is also lower 
than in other country groups.  It is 
lower than rates prevailing in several 
other transition countries (12-45 
percent for skilled, 6-13 percent for 
unskilled workers), in selected 
developing countries (47-70 percent for 
skilled, 34-53 percent unskilled), and 
significantly below OECD countries as 
a group (typically above 50 percent). It 
is possible, though unlikely, that these low estimates for Russia are a statistical artifact.
19  
The recent survey of enterprise training practices by Lazareva, Denisova, and Tsukhlo 
(2006) reports somewhat higher figures – about 20 percent of workers – for Russia that 
are below those of OECD countries, though it is unclear whether weighting would reduce 
their estimates of share of workers trained. 
   
                                                 
18 The sample is restricted to those countries included in the 2005 BEEPS or with Investment Climate 
Surveys that asked about in-service training and the shares of skilled and unskilled workers that received 
formal training.  Skilled workers are defined to include managers, professionals and skilled production 
workers, while unskilled workers include unskilled production workers, and other non-production or other 
white collar employees. 
19 In the Russia ICS, firms reported shares of workers trained in several intervals, including an open-ended 
“35 percent or more” trained.  In calculating shares trained, the mean for this last interval was assumed 
generously to be 45 percent, possibly biasing up training estimates for Russia.  Tabulations of the small 
sample of Russian firms in BEEPS also reveal low shares of workers trained relative to other countries in 
the 2005 BEEPS sample. 
Table 11. Share of Workforce Trained 
 Country  Data Source 
Share of workforce 
trained 
  Skilled   Unskilled  
BRIC      
  Russia   2005 ICS  7.7  1.4 
  Brazil   2003 ICS  52.8  45.4 
  China  2003 ICS  44.5  28.5 
Transition      
  Bulgaria  2004 ICS  24.0  13.0 
  Lithuania  2004 ICS  11.9  4.0 
  Serbia  2003 ICS  45.2  6.1 
OECD      
  Germany  2005 BEEPS  37.3  27.2 
  Greece  2005 BEEPS  53.6  36.8 
  Ireland  2005 BEEPS  76.0  68.1 
  Portugal  2005 BEEPS  75.2  50.2 
  Spain  2005 BEEPS  76.1  56.2 
  South Korea  2005 BEEPS  65.4  59.2 
Developing      
  Chile  2004 ICS  48.3  36.0 
  Malaysia  2002 ICS  69.6  52.7 
  Sri Lanka  2004 ICS  47.4  34.1 
      
  Notes:  Country samples restricted to manufacturing firms, 
and shares of workers trained are weighted estimates using the 
firm size distribution of India.    27
Which firms train and where do they get their training?  Table 12 presents information on 
the distribution and sources of in-service training, cross-classified by several firm 
attributes that are hypothesized to shape skills demand (and incentives to train), including 
employment size, export orientation, positive expenditures on R&D, foreign ownership, 
government control and the investment 
risk of the region. 
 
The simple tabulations suggest that the 
incidence of in-service training is 
higher among firms that are larger, are 
export-oriented and that invest in R&D.  
Long-established firms pre-dating the 
transition are more likely to provide in-
service training than newer firms. 
Domestically-owned firms tend to train 
relative to foreign owned firms, and 
government ownership makes no 
difference to the likelihood of training. 
Localities rated as being moderate 
investment risk regions tend to have 
higher incidence of training as 
compared to either minimal risk or high 
risk regions. 
 
Are firms reporting under-staffing more 
likely to train to meet skills shortfalls?  
Surprisingly, the answer to this 
question is no.  In tables and analysis 
not shown here, reported under-staffing 
was not correlated with in-service 
training; neither were employer assessments of occupation-specific under-staffing.  In 
fact, firms that reported themselves as being over-staffed were more likely than firms 
with optimal staffing or under-staffing to provide in-service training.  One explanation, 
consistent with Table 6, is that skills shortages in specific skills groups can co-exist with 
overall optimal or over-staffing, so even these firms train.  Another explanation is that 
there are different sources of demand for training, not just for making up numerical labor 
shortfalls, but also for meeting the specific skills needs of exporting and new technology, 
as suggested by Table 12.  
 
So why do Russian firms not train in-house to meet skills shortfalls?  Information on why 
employers might not train or train very little was not elicited in the Russia ICS but is 
available in the World Business Environment Survey (WBES). WBES asked firms to 
rank a series of statements about what factors influenced their decisions on how much to 
invest in training workers.
20  Figure 11 graphs these WBES rankings separately for firms 
                                                 
20  The World Business Environment Survey (WBES) was an enterprise survey fielded to more than 10,000 
firms in 80 countries between late 1998 and mid-2000. The analyses reported in Batra and Stone (2004) are 









All firms  42.81  62.37  69.60 
SME (<250 workers) 
No 51.41  72.71  79.12 
Yes 31.08  48.33  56.67 
Exporter 
No 35.87  55.82  63.54 
Yes 51.24  70.34  76.96 
Firm has R&D spending 
no 34.72  55.15  62.15 
yes 48.13  68.03  75.24 
New firm (established on or after 1992) 
no 43.54  64.27  70.76 
yes 41.31  55.19  65.42 
Firm has FDI (% of foreign ownership>=10%) 
no 43.16  64.43  71.02 
yes 42.22  58.77  67.13 
Government  controlled ( 25% or more of shares) 
no 43.03  62.23  69.77 
yes 42.49  62.60  69.33 
Investment risk of the region 
minimal 37.91 60.71  66.34 
moderate 48.27  66.67 75.50 
high 41.64  59.33  66.36 
   Source:   Russia LME Survey, 2005   28
that train (using in-house or external facilities) and for those that do not.  Firms that do 
not train are substantially more likely than firms that do to agree with the following key 
reasons for not training.  First, a majority of firms identified technologies they were using 
as “mature”, and hence did not require training or skills upgrading to use that technology.  
Second, many cited “lack of affordability of training” because of limited funding, which 
might suggest a weakness in financial markets.  Third, many alluded to the high labor 
turnover of trained staff, an externality which prevents them from recouping the cost of 
training. Finally, many employers suggested that informal on-the-job training was 
adequate or that skilled workers were readily available in the labor market.  
 
Figure 11. Ranking of Reasons for Not Providing In-Service Training 
  Source:  Batra and Stone (2004) using data from World Business Environment Survey. 
 
 
Determinants of In-Service Training 
 
The importance of these (and other) training correlates can be investigated within a 
regression framework using a probit model.
21  The model estimates the probability of in-
service training by regressing the “any formal training” variable on a set of explanatory 
variables, including measures of firm size, the share of workers with higher education, 
other firm attributes such as export orientation, R&D spending, foreign or government 
ownership, and independent assessments of the regions investment climate risk.  A 
corresponding set of regressions was estimated separately for the probability of in-house 





                                                                                                                                                 
based on a special survey module administered in 28 of the WBES countries that focused on issues of 
competition, trade, and firm capabilities in terms of technology, and worker training. 
21 The advantage of regression analysis over tabular information is that the independent effects of each 
variable (or set of variables) can be analyzed holding constant the effects of other hypothesized correlates. 
Reasons for Not Training Workers More
1.00 1.50 2.00 2.50 3.00 3.50 4.00
Skepticism about benefits of training
Adequate skills acquired from school
Lack of knowledge about techniques
Skilled w orkers hired elsewhere
Adequate in-house informal training 
Costly of high labor turnover
Unaffordable due to firms limited resources
Mature technology used & new workrs proficient 
Extent of Agreement with Reason (5=Maximimum)
Firms that used external facilities
for training
Firms that used own facilities for
training
Firms that did not train  29
Table 13. Determinants of In-service Training and Training by Source 
 
  Probit Model Specification 





Firm size dummies       
   Small size (101-250 workers)  0.084  0.108  0.102 
 (1.42)  (1.41)  (1.56) 
   Medium size (251-1000 workers)  0.219  0.22  0.257 
 (3.76)***  (2.90)***  (3.96)*** 
   Large size( >1000)  0.273  0.381  0.334 
 (4.86)***  (4.58)***  (5.24)*** 
% higher educated workers  0.003  0.000  0.003 
 (2.45)**  (0.03)  (2.37)** 
New firm (after 1992)  -0.034  -0.002  -0.068 
 (-0.93)  (-0.05)  (-1.72)* 
Exporter 0.055  0.065  0.063 
 (1.71)  (1.82)*  (1.81)* 
Positive R&D spending  0.081  0.074  0.06 
 (2.29)**  (1.91)*  (1.59) 
R&D sales ratio  1.071  0.549  0.283 
 (0.99)  (0.66)  (0.32) 
Some foreign ownership (>10%)  -0.05  0.037  -0.079 
 (-1.06)  (0.74)  (-1.57) 
Government control (>25%)  0.059  -0.015  0.115 
 (1.40)  (-0.33)  (2.58)** 
IC risk is moderate  0.097  0.106  0.058 
 (2.70)**  (2.59)**  (1.48) 
IC risk is high  0.012  0.039  -0.009 
 (0.34)  (0.95)  (-0.22) 
Missing values  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 990  981  986 
Source:  Russia LME Survey, 2005       
 
 
The regression results, reported in Table 13, confirm the importance of several factors 
that shape the demand for in-service training provision.  First, bearing out the correlations 
reported in earlier tables, the likelihood of in-service training is higher in larger firms 
(those with over 250 employees), and in localities that are rated as being “moderate” 
investment risk regions rather than either “low” or “high” risk regions.  Second, firms 
that employ a larger proportion of workers with higher education are also more likely to 
train.  The empirical evidence internationally is that both forms of skills – education 
attainment of the workforce and post-school training – are highly correlated.
22  Educated 
workers are not only more productive in performing given tasks, but are thought to be 
more adept at critically evaluating new information and learning from it.  
 
                                                 
22 See Tan and Batra 1995 for estimates on the education-training relationship from five developing 
countries in East Asia and Latin America; Tan 2000 and World Bank (1997, 2005) for related training 
analyses for Malaysia.    30
Firms that engage in R&D, and to a lesser extent, export-oriented firms are also more 
likely to train. The technology literature suggests that much of the productivity gains 
from introducing a new innovation are realized through an intensive learning-by-doing 
process (Enos 1962; Bell and Pavitt, 1992) and firms, to effectively use the new 
technology, have to adjust management, reorganize production lines, and upgrade worker 
skills. Export orientation can also have a salutary effect on training provision.  Employers 
that export have greater incentives to train their workers to produce high quality products 
meeting the exacting standards of foreign buyers, and to increase labor productivity to 
meet competitive pressures (Tan and Batra 1995;  Batra and Stone 2004). 
 
The second and third columns of Table 13 highlight differences in the determinants of 
external and in-house training. Training from external sources tend to be more common 
among long-established firms where the government has controlling interests, and in 
export oriented firms with a high share of highly educated workers.  This reliance on 
external training appears to be a carry-over from the pre-transition period where many 
state-owned enterprises (SOE) had arrangements to hire specifically-trained graduates 
from related vocational and technical training institutions.  By contrast, in-house training 
is shaped less by the share of highly educated workers, and more by the firm’s export-
orientation, location in moderate investment risk regions, and R&D spending. Employers 
appear to rely more on in-house training when industry or work-relevant skills are not 
available locally or when innovative activities require intensive on-the-job learning and 






Box 4.  Public and Private Sector Training Sources 
 
The Russia ICS did not distinguish between public and private sector sources of in-service 
training.  However, the ICS of many other developing countries elicited information on 
which external training providers firms used, including public VET institutions, private 
training companies, buyers, other firms to which enterprises were linked, and companies 
selling equipment and machinery.  The detailed data indicated that enterprises in many 
developing countries preferred private sector providers over public ones, even when private 
training cost more than often-free training services from public VET institutions, in large 
part because private training was tailored to their specific needs and delivered at times and 
in places that met their requirements. The data also revealed that buyers, partner firms and 
equipment suppliers are important sources of training and know-how transfer. That firms 
prefer public over private training sources is supported by analyses that suggest that for 
some countries, the productivity impacts of private external training exceeds those from 
public external training, which are often statistically insignificant. 
 
Source:  Tan, Pei and Savchenko (2003), “Enterprise Training in Developing Countries:  Evidence 
from Investment Climate Surveys”, unpublished World Bank Institute working paper.   31
 
V. Productivity and Wage Outcomes of Training 
 
Provision of in-service training only makes sense if employers’ investments in the 
training and skills-upgrading of employees yield positive returns in the form of higher 
productivity and profits.  If formal training is found to be associated with higher firm-
level productivity, as suggested by the preponderance of evidence from both 
industrialized and developing countries
23, the question is which source of training (in-
house company programs or training from external training providers) has the largest 
impact on productivity?  See Box 4.  If training yields positive impacts on productivity, 
employers also need to determine whether, or how much, to share productivity gains 
from training with workers in the form of higher wages.  This calculus will depend on 
how transferable skills gained from training are to other potential employers (see Becker 
1976; Tan 1980; Acemoglu and Pischke 1998). 
 
A production function approach is used to estimate the productivity impact of training. 
The dependent variable—the logarithm of value added—is regressed on the logarithms of 
capital (book value of physical plant and equipment assets), alternative measure of 
training (any formal training, in-house or external training, and combinations of training 
sources), and a vector of control variables for worker attributes (mean years of education) 
and for location in moderate or high investment risk regions.  The production functions, 
estimated by ordinary least squares, implicitly treat the different training variables as 
being exogenously determined.  This assumption may be suspect if the firms that train are 
also more productive, and systematically self-select themselves into the training group on 
the basis of unobserved productivity traits so that production function estimates of 
training are potentially biased.  Qualitatively similar productivity (and wage) results 
obtain when account is taken of self-selection into training.  See Annex 1. 
 
Table 14 reports the production function results and estimates of the productivity effects 
of training.  Before turning to the training results, some parameters estimated by these 
models are noteworthy.  First, the estimated production function parameters of capital 
and labor coefficient are positive and statistically significant, and consistent with those 
reported by other studies of the Russian economy.  Second, consistent with the belief that 
education raises productivity, the production function results indicate that increased 
educational attainment of the firm’s workforce of one year is associated with higher 
levels of firm-level productivity of about 4-5 percent.  Third, regions with moderate or 
high investment risk have productivity levels 27 to 33 percent lower, respectively, than 
regions with low investment risk. It appears that firms in “moderate” to “high” 
investment risk regions have greater incentives to train in-house to compensate for skills 
shortfalls in the local markets and for their lower overall productivity levels. 
 
                                                 
23 Cross-sectional studies have found a strong positive association between in-service training and 
productivity and wage levels of firms (Tan and Batra 1995; Batra and Stone 2004).     32
 
Table 14.  In-Service Training and Productivity  
 
Dependent variable:  Log(VA)  Model specifications 
  
Log(Capital)  0.197 0.196 0.196 
  (6.77)*** (6.68)*** (6.58)*** 
Log(Labor)  0.889 0.876 0.877 
  (15.57)*** (15.45)*** (15.28)*** 
Mean years of education  0.055  0.056  0.057 
  (2.69)** (2.74)** (2.72)** 
Regional IC risk is moderate  -0.277  -0.277  -0.272 
  (-3.08)*** (-3.01)*** (-3.00)*** 
Regional IC risk is high  -0.332  -0.330  -0.333 
  (-4.41)*** (-4.39)*** (-4.42)*** 
Any formal training  0.225     
 (3.48)***     
In-house training    0.092   
   (1.19)  
External  training   0.22  
   (3.27)***   
Only in-house training      -0.003 
     (-0.03) 
Only external training      0.168 
     (1.99)* 
Both in-house & external training      0.281 
     (4.06)*** 
Constant 8.64  8.695  8.708 
  (30.41)*** (30.27)*** (30.21)*** 
Missing  values  Yes Yes Yes 
Regional  cluster  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  784 784 784 
R-squared  0.64 0.64 0.64 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% levels. 
Source: Russia LME Survey, 2005. 
 
The production function results provide support for the hypothesis that training improves 
productivity. The measure for any formal in-service training is positive and statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level, and suggests that training is associated with a 22 percent 
increase in firm-level productivity. When training is disaggregated by source, only 
external training is significant.  However, when firms are distinguished by whether they 
rely only on in-house, only on external training, or use both in-house and external 
training, the results suggest that using both sources of training is most productive (28 
percent), while using only external training sources is associated with a 17 percent 
increase in productivity. 
   33
For the wage analysis, a wage model is estimated both at the level of the firm, using the 
logarithm of mean monthly wage and training of the firm, and for the pooled sample of 
occupations within each firm to exploit the availability of occupation-specific 
information on wages.  The logarithm of monthly per-worker firm-level or occupation-
specific wages is regressed on the training variables, a vector of firm attributes, and 
average years of education of the workforce.  For the occupational wage model, data on 
up to five occupational groups per firm are pooled and indicator variables included for 
managers, professionals, skilled workers and unskilled workers (the omitted category 
being “other white-collar employees”) in place of mean years of education with which 
occupations are closely correlated.  The pooled sample consists of 3,026 occupations 
from the 923 firms, and the regression model accounts for the common error structure for 
all occupations in the same firm. 
 
Table 15.  Cross-Sectional Wage Models with Training 
 
Dependent variable: 
 log(monthly wage)  Firm-level Wage Model Occupation  Wage  Model 
    
Constant 10.224  10.205  7.993  7.903 
  (46.85)*** (47.58)*** (48.34)***  (49.81)*** 
Any formal training  0.16    0.091   
 (3.29)***    (1.58)   
In-house  training   0.044   0.160 
   (0.75)   (3.02)*** 
External  training   0.178   0.096 
   (4.21)***   (1.48) 
Small enterprise (<250)  -0.162  -0.147  -0.199  -0.177 
  (-3.18)*** (-2.90)*** (-3.60)***  (-3.20)*** 
Some foreign ownership  -0.109  -0.101  0.084  0.087 
 -(1.29)  -(1.21)  (1.17)  (1.23) 
Government controlled  0.059  0.047  -0.06  -0.059 
 (0.72)  (0.58)  (-0.84)  (-0.81) 
Exporter 0.102  0.095  0.06  0.044 
 (2.08)**  (1.84)*  (1.27)  (0.94) 
Positive  R&D  spending  0.054 0.052 0.178  0.168 
 (0.94)  (0.91)  (3.07)***  (2.93)*** 
R&D sales ratio  1.728  1.765  0.069  0.074 
 (3.10)***  (3.37)***  (1.03)  (1.09) 
New Firm (after 1992)  0.018  0.021  -0.199  -0.177 
 (0.28)  (0.33)  (-3.60)***  (-3.20)*** 
Mean years of education  0.061  0.061  n.a.  n.a. 
 (3.82)***  (3.87)***     
Occupation dummies  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Observations 923  923  3,026  3,026 
R-squared 0.08  0.09  0.241  0.253 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses.  All regressions include control variables for 
missing values and for regions. 
* significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% levels. 
Source: Russia LME Survey, 2005.   34
 
Similar positive impacts of training are found on average monthly wages in firms. Table 
15 reports the results for firm-level wages in the first two columns, and the results for the 
occupation-level wages in the next two columns.  In general, Russian employers pay 
higher wages when enterprises are large (with over 250 employees) and export-oriented, 
engage in R&D activities, and employ a more highly educated workforce. Consistent 
with the earlier training-productivity finding, enterprises that train also pay monthly 
wages that are 16 percent higher than non-training firms, a difference that is statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level.  
 
The wage impacts of training differ by training source depending on whether firm-level 
or occupation-level wages are being studied. The firm-level results suggest that external 
training is associated with the largest wage gains (18 percent) while the wage effects of 
in-house training programs are not statistically significant. On the other hand, 
occupational wages are most strongly affected by in-house training (16 percent), a result 
that is statistically significant, but they are not affected by training from external sources.  
By averaging across occupations, firm-level mean wages may conceal considerable 
within-firm variation in wages by skills or occupational levels.  Plausibly, this dispersion 
of skills-wage differentials both within and across firms is better explained by in-house 
training than by external training, and may reflect skills-wage premiums associated with 





Skills Development and Firm Performance over Time 
 
Do the cross-sectional productivity and wage effects of skills training persist in the time-
series?  To investigate this question, a sub-sample of the Russia ICS survey is linked to 
Box 5.  Panel Estimates of the Productivity and Wage Effects of Training 
 
Several panel studies, based on longitudinal firm surveys in Britain, Mexico and Malaysia 
that elicited repeated information on the training practices of the same firms over time, have 
investigated and found evidence that training leads causally to higher firm-level growth in 
productivity and wages.  In Malaysia and Mexico, training histories of firms over a 10 year 
period were used to construct training indicators for use in panel production function and 
wage models.  Firms that trained repeatedly experienced higher rates of productivity growth 
than those that did not train or that had one-off training; productivity growth was especially 
high when training firms also invested in new technology.  Firms that trained continuously 
were also more likely to move up into higher deciles of the wage distribution or, 
alternatively, less likely to slip into lower wage deciles over time.    
 
Sources:  Dearden, Reed and Van Reenen (2000) for Britain; Tan (2000) for Malaysia; and Tan and 
Lopez-Acevedo (2003) for Mexico.   35
financial data on the same enterprises for earlier years using the SPARK database.
24  The 
panel analysis focuses on combined data for the same enterprises in two years, 2000 and 
2004
25, and it relies on the strong assumption that the training information (and that for 
other control variables) elicited in the 2005 Russia ICS is pertinent to the entire 4 year 
period under consideration. This assumption may be relaxed when the Russia ICS sample 
is tracked over time and repeated measures of training become available, allowing true 
panel estimates of the productivity and wage effects of training (see Box 5).  
 
Three measures of firm performance over time – growth in sales, growth in value-added
26 
and growth in employment – are investigated. Underlying the first two measures is a 
production function model, and as such the growth equations include as explanatory 
variables growth in the logarithms of capital and labor, training, and other variables 
reported in the earlier cross-section regressions.  The third measure is growth in the 
logarithm of employment (a measure of job creation), and this regression includes growth 
in the logarithm of capital, training and the other control variables. The results are 
reported in Table 16. 
 
Formal in-service training has a positive and statistically significant impact on all three 
measures of firm performance over time.  The presence of in-service training increases 
output growth, measured either by sales or by value added, by an average of between 17 
and 21 percent over the 2000 to 2004 period.  Training raises employment growth by 15 
percent over the same period. When training source is distinguished, only training from 
external sources has an effect on output growth, and it is only statistically significant at 
the 10 percent level in the value-added output specification.  By contrast, both in-house 
and external training have a positive and significant impact on employment growth, with 
in-house training having the larger impact (14 percent) on job creation as compared to 
external training (9 percent). 
 
The other correlates of firm performance are not without interest.  Research and 
development (R&D) and export-orientation have a marginally significant positive impact 
on output growth over time, varying by output measure.   Exporting is associated with 
sales growth (13 percent), and R&D spending with higher value-added growth. 
Consistent with the results in the productivity chapter, firms doing R&D have lower 
initial levels of productivity (16-18 percent), though productivity growth is raised (6 
percent) by a 1 percent increase in R&D spending as a proportion of sales.  Finally, 
employment growth over time is higher in firms that were small (less than 250 




                                                 
24 SPARK is the largest database on enterprises containing uniform information on a set of key financial 
data drawn from more than 10 official sources, including the Federal Statistics Service, the Federal Tax 
Service, the Federal Financial Markets Service and other government agencies. 
25 The year 2000 was selected because it is the last year that information on total employment is available 
in the SPARK database. 
26 Value added in this panel analysis is approximated by the sum of gross profits and wage bill, since 
information on the value of intermediate inputs needed to calculate value added are not reported in SPARK.   36
Table 16.  Training and Firm Performance from 2000 to 2004  
 
 Model  specification 
Dependent variable:  Log(Δ Sales)  Log(Δ VA) Log(Δ Labor) 
     
Log (Δ Labor)  0.68  0.681  0.662  0.67     
 (11.05)***  (10.98)***  (8.96)***  (9.04)***     
Log (Δ Capital)  0.221  0.222  0.136  0.14  0.161  0.16 
 (6.86)***  (6.87)***  (3.63)***  (3.74)***  (9.22)***  (9.16)** 
Any formal training  0.165    0.217    0.147   
 (2.10)*    (2.45)**    (3.27)***   
In-house training    0.044    -0.032    0.145 
    (0.56)   (-0.35)   (3.26)** 
External training    0.09    0.181    0.094 
   (1.13)    (1.99)*    (2.07)* 
SME in 1999  0.062  0.057  -0.018  -0.039  0.247  0.264 
 (0.80)  (0.73)  (-0.20)  (-0.44)  (5.70)***  (6.09)** 
New Firm  0.086  0.084  -0.122  -0.157  0.048  0.053 
 (0.91)  (0.88)  (-1.01)  (-1.29)  (0.85)  (0.95) 
Positive R&D spending  -0.102  -0.098  -0.179  -0.161  0.024  0.014 
 (-1.21)  (-1.16)  (-1.89)*  (-1.70)  (0.50)  (0.28) 
R&D / Sales ratio (x100)  -0.524  -0.446  0.057  0.057  -0.010  -0.010 
 (-0.25)  (-0.22)  (1.89)*  (1.88)*  (-0.84)  (-0.88) 
Exporter 0.132  0.13  0.053  0.054  0.072  0.063 
 (1.81)*  (1.76)*  (0.63)  (0.64)  (1.69)  (1.47) 
Constant 0.186  0.22  0.123  0.164  -0.28  -0.294 
 (2.42)**  (2.97)***  (1.38)  (1.92)*  (-5.38)**  (-5.88)** 
Missing values  Yes  Yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Observations 774  774  544  544  777  777 
R-squared 0.28  0.28  0.22  0.23  0.22  0.23 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Source: Russia LME Survey, 2005. 
  
Training and Innovative Capacity 
 
Training and innovation are complementary activities, in the sense that the firm’s 
capacity to innovate or absorb new technology, and to benefit from innovation and 
adoption, depends critically on the skills and training of the workforce.  The previous 
analyses have already shown in-service training and R&D spending (a crude measure of 
innovation) to be highly correlated.  Training is also highly correlated with other 
indicators of innovativeness – such as third party R&D or licensing of patents and know-
how, introduction of new production technologies or high-technology exports.  The more 
pertinent issue is not just whether training and innovation are correlated, but whether 
innovation is possible without a highly skilled and trained workforce? 
 
One approach to addressing this issue is to ask how firms decide to innovate or to train 
their workers, and whether these two investment decisions co-vary in systematic ways.  
Are they made independently, or jointly?  If the two decisions are independent, then   37
separate models can be estimated for each decision with the other decision variable 
included as an exogenous explanatory variable.  If they are not independent, then both 
decisions to train and to innovate must be modeled jointly.  Furthermore, their impacts on 
outcomes such as improved productivity or wage gains must be estimated accounting not 
only for selection bias (see Annex 1 on using a “treatment effects” model) but also for the 
joint nature in which both decisions are made. 
 
Table 17.  Innovation and Training Variables 
 
Innovation measures 
Sample size if meet 
innovation criterion 
% training if meet 
innovation criterion 
  Yes No  Yes  No 
        
   R&D spending over 1 million rubles  211  779  0.79  0.67 
   Introduced new process technology  293  697  0.80  0.65 
   Purchased patents, licenses or know-how  161  829  0.74  0.69 
Composite innovation indicator  463  527  0.77  0.63 
  Source:  Russia LME Survey, 2005, figures calculated by the authors. 
 
In this section, we test the maintained hypothesis that innovation and training are 
complementary activities.  As the measure of innovation, a composite indicator variable 
is used, with a value of 1 if the firm has substantial R&D spending (over a million 
rubles), OR has purchased technology licenses, patents and know-how, OR has 
introduced new production processes, and 0 otherwise.  Table 17 shows the distribution 
of firms for each of the variables that make up this composite innovation indicator.  463 
firms are defined as being “innovative”, and those so defined are more likely to train (77 
percent) as compared to those that are not (63 percent).  Each of the innovation variables 
that go into the composite indicator are similarly correlated with training. 
 
A bivariate probit model is jointly estimated for the two decision variables – whether or 
not to innovate, and to train – each equation having some explanatory variables in 
common, but also others that are assumed to affect one decision but not the other.
27  The 
bivariate regression results for the innovation and training equations are reported in Table 
18.  Many of the training results have been reported previously and will not be elaborated 
on further. The innovation equation, however, is new.  The results suggest that innovating 
firms tend to be larger, use relatively new machinery and equipment, export and employ a 
more educated workforce.  More pertinent is the estimate of rho, which measures the 
covariance in the errors of the innovation and training equations.  Both Wald and 
likelihood ratio tests reject the null hypothesis that rho is equal 0, that is, they confirm 
that the innovation and training decisions are made jointly. 
 
 
                                                 
27 Each equation must be identified by having one or more instruments that affect (or are highly correlated 
with) that choice variable but not the other.  For the innovation equation, the instruments are indicators for 
having newer equipment and having received government support for R&D.  For the training equation, the 
corresponding instruments are an index of difficulty searching for and hiring professionals and skilled 
workers, and whether the enterprise is under-staffed or over-staffed.   38
Table 18.  Bivariate Probit Regressions of Innovation and Training 
 
Dependent variables:  Innovation and Training  Coefficient z-score 
Innovation Equation    
  Firm size (101-250)  0.184  0.97 
  Firm size (251-1000)  0.492  2.56 
  Firm size (>1000)  1.031  4.65 
  New equipment dummy*  0.264  3.04 
  Percent workforce with higher education  0.008  2.39 
  New firm dummy (established after 1992)  -0.019  -0.18 
  Exporter   0.361  4.05 
  Foreign owned (foreign ownership >=10%)  0.111  0.88 
  Government control dummy (government >=25%)  -0.009  -0.08 
  Received any government support for R&D  0.047  0.37 
  Constant  -0.939  -4.82 
Training Equation    
  SME indicator (<250 workers)  -0.521  -5.73 
  Percent workforce with higher education  0.010  2.84 
  New firm (established after 1992)  -0.115  -1.09 
  Exporter  0.202  2.17 
  Foreign owned (foreign ownership >=10%)  -0.194  -1.45 
 Government control (government >=25%)  0.187  1.48 
  Difficulty hiring skilled and professional workers**  0.108  1.16 
  Firm overstaffed indicator  0.015  0.15 
  Firm understaffed indicator  0.460  3.05 
  Constant  0.403  3.49 
Number of observations  979 
Rho 0.1125 
Wald test - chi2(24)  170.2 
Log pseudo-likelihood = -1174.4488  Prob > chi2  0 
Source:  Russia LME Survey, 2005 
Notes:    * new equipment =1 if less than 50 % of equipment is fully depreciated 
             ** difficulty of hiring skilled and professional workers =1 if firm ranked difficulty of either  
                  skills group a 4 or 5 on 1-5 scale (5 being the most difficult) 
 
 
The bivariate probit model also yields estimates of the probabilities that firms choose one 
investment activity but not the other, choose both activities, or choose neither one.  To 
simplify description, let Pr(ij) be the joint probability of innovation i and training j.  For 
the ICS sample as a whole, the least likely probabilities are Pr(10) – firms innovate but 
do not train (10 percent) – and Pr(00), firms engage in neither activity (11 percent).  It is 
much more common for firms to train but not innovate, Pr(01) of 36 percent, or invest in 
both innovation and training at the same time, Pr(11) of 22 percent.  The model also 
yields estimates of the probability of one investment activity conditional on the other 
taking place.  Denote these as Pr(i|j) and Pr(j|i). The conditional probability of innovating 
given training is not high, Pr(i|j) is 43 percent, suggesting that firms have many other 
reasons for training, not just to support innovation.  In contrast, the conditional 
probability of training given innovation is much higher, Pr(j|i) of 73 percent, supporting 
the maintained hypothesis that skills and training are needed to complement investments 
in innovative activities of the firm.   39
 
Table 19 reports the predicted joint probabilities of innovation and training disaggregated 
by several firm attributes.  The tabulations are restricted to those firm characteristics that 
allow us to discriminate among the different predicted joint probabilities.  First, they 
suggest that larger firms are more likely to invest in both innovation and training (46 
percent) or just training alone (33 percent), as compared to small firms which are more 
likely to just train (36 percent) than invest in both innovation and training (22 percent).  
Similarly, exporting firms are more likely to both innovate and to train (47 percent) than 
just invest in training (30 percent), while non-exporters are more likely to just train (38 
percent).  Finally, over-staffed firms are more likely to invest in both innovation and 
training (47 percent) or in just training (37 percent), as compared to optimally-staffed or 
under-staffed firms who are equally likely to do both or to just invest in training (about 
33-35 percent). 
 











Total sample  0.19  0.34  0.11  0.36 
Small enterprise (<250)         
   No  0.11  0.33  0.10  0.46 
   Yes  0.30  0.36  0.13  0.22 
Exporter        
   No  0.25  0.38  0.11  0.26 
   Yes  0.11  0.30  0.11  0.47 
Staffing in the firm         
  Optimal  0.20  0.33  0.12  0.34 
  Understaffed  0.20  0.35  0.11  0.34 
  Overstaffed  0.09  0.37  0.06  0.47 
Source:  Russia LME Survey, 2005 
 Notes:   predicted probabilities from bivariate probit model, see Table 18.  
 
 
Table 20 reports estimates of production functions and wage equations which include 
predicted joint probabilities of innovation and training, with the omitted category being 
the prediction of investing in neither innovation or training. By construction, these 
predicted joint probabilities are uncorrelated with the error terms of the model, yielding 
unbiased (but inefficient) estimates of the innovation and training variables.  For 
comparison, the same models are estimated using indicator variables of innovation and 
training, both treated as being exogenously determined outside the model, to characterize 
firms as just innovating, just training, or doing both.  The production function results 
indicate that only joint investments in innovation and training improve firm-level 
productivity.  This may be contrasted with the alternative “exogenous” model, where 
“just training” or “both training and innovating” is associated with productivity increases, 
but not “just innovating”.   The wage regression using predicted values suggest that all 
three states – just training, just innovating, and investing in both activities – are 
associated with positive wage gains.  Curiously, just innovating but not training has the 
largest coefficient.  The alternative “exogenous” wage model also yields different results,   40
namely that “just training” or “investing in both” show wage gains, but “just innovating” 
does not. 
 
Table 20.  Production Functions and Wage Models 
Estimated with Exogenous or Predicted Innovation and Training 
 
Dependent variables:  Log(value-added) Log(wages) 
Predicted joint probabilities    
   (innovate=0, train=1)  -0.186    1.437   
 (-0.23)    (2.31)*   
   (innovate=1, train=0)  0.712    2.490   
 (0.50)    (2.66)**   
   (innovate=1, train=1)  1.199    1.889   
    (2.66)**      (4.32)**   
Exogenous Innovation and Training        
    (innovate=0, train=1)    0.242    0.153 
   (2.60)**    (2.63)** 
    (innovate=1, train=0)    0.139    0.100 
   (1.13)    (1.50) 
    (innovate=1, train=1)    0.303    0.165 
   (3.12)***    (2.66)** 
Mean years of workforce education  0.036  0.05  0.038  0.054 
 (1.82)*  (2.55)**  (2.79)***  (3.39)*** 
        
Observations 775  784  911  923 
R-squared 0.64  0.63  0.13  0.12 
Source:  Russia LME Survey, 2005 
Notes:    Production functions include logarithms of capital, labor, and controls for missing values and  
              region. Wage equations include firm size, ownership, new firm, and controls for missing values,  
              region, and industry.  * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
 
VI. Summary and Policy Implications 
 
Together, the analyses of the Russia ICS data and comparisons of findings with those 
from other developed and developing countries, suggest that employer perceptions about 
a shortage of skilled and qualified workers are real.  They tell a broadly consistent story 
about the nature of skills shortages: a high and rising demand for educated and skilled 
workers; an educational and training system that is under-funded below the tertiary level 
and faced with numerous challenges including deteriorating quality and becoming more 
responsive to industry’s skills needs; an industrial sector experiencing high labor turnover 
(which inhibits training), constraints on its ability to flexibly adjust its workforce and 
skills mix, and for some non-competitive enterprises the inability to pay competitive 
wages to attract and retain needed skills. They suggest that most enterprises have not 
responded to these skills shortages by taking responsibility for training their employees 
in-house, and training more of them, despite the productivity and wage gains that might 
come from such investments.   
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These results have implications for training policy in Russia.  To begin, it is clear that 
Russian industrial enterprises under-invest in the training of their employees. While the 
incidence is high, the proportion of employees provided in-house trained in different 
skills categories is one of the lowest among the countries for which data are available, 
both high-income and developing countries. If in-service training is critical to the 
effective use of new technologies and to productivity growth, as the literature and the 
estimates reported in this paper suggests, than Russia’s under-investment in workforce 
skills places it at a relative disadvantage compared to its OECD, BRIC and East Asian 
competitors. Improving the investment climate in Russia should have a salutary effect on 
business operations and growth, and create incentives for the private sector to invest in 
both physical and human capital. Policies to foster greater technological change should 


























Market failures diminish employer incentives to train and the appropriate policy response 
will depend on the nature of the market failure. While not Russia-specific, available 
WBES data suggest that three market failures—high cost of training, training 
externalities from turnover of skilled workers, and information problems—are key 
constraints for training.  Financial sector reforms to improve access to funding for all 
kinds of investments, including training, are likely to be most important for smaller 
enterprises. When poor information is the constraint, the appropriate policy response is to 
disseminate widely the evidence on the productivity benefits of training, best practices in 
training know-how, and information about the availability, offerings and cost of services 
Box 6. Malaysia’s Human Resource Development Fund 
 
The Human Resource Development Fund (HRDF) was established in 1993 to promote increased 
enterprise-based training among firms, first in manufacturing and then more recently in service sectors 
as well. The Act created a council (HRDC), with representatives from the private sector and from 
responsible government agencies, and a Secretariat to administer the different HRDF schemes. Eligible 
employers with 50 or more employees are required to contribute 1 percent of payroll to the HRDF from 
which they are then eligible to claim a portion of allowable training expenditures up to the limit of their 
total levy payments for any given year.  The HRDC set rates of reimbursement, varying by type of 
training and higher for smaller firms. 
 
The HRDF requires firms to spend a minimum amount on training or loose their levy contribution, thus 
creating incentives for firms to train rather than “poach” skilled workers from other employers. It offers 
different schemes that give employers flexibility in training in-house, or using a variety of external 
public and private sector providers including second-tier public-private intermediaries such as state-
level skill development centers.  This funding had the additional effect of creating a vibrant training 
market, with public and private sector providers competing for resources.  It addresses information 
constraints through public information campaigns, subsidized delivery of training need assessments 
(TNAs) to small and medium enterprises (SMEs), certification of training providers and wide 
dissemination of their offerings, and electronic billing to keep employers informed of their levy use 
status.  Recognizing the funding constraints of SMEs, the HRDC enlists certified providers to act as its 
agents, collecting from users the fees for which firms are responsible and claiming the reimbursable 
balance from HRDF, thus reducing up-front cash outlays from SMEs.  
 
Source:  Tan (2000)    42
from different public and private sector training providers. And when employer 
incentives to train are low because of turnover or “poaching” of skilled workers by other 
employers, mandates or collective action to get all firms to train can help internalize 
some of these externalities from training.   The Human Resource Development Fund of 
Malaysia is one example of such a training policy and it has, since its introduction in the 
mid-1990s, successfully increased training among firms (see Box 6).
28   
. 
Box 7.  International Experience with Training Payroll Levies 
 
International experience with training payroll levies suggests that the following factors 
must be borne in mind: 
•  Employers buy-in for any schemes is crucial.  For a scheme to be successful, 
governments should ensure that employers are consulted at an early stage and are 
involved in designing, implementing and evaluating the fund.  
•  Funds collected must be earmarked for training.  In some countries, funds are co-
mingled with general revenues and used for other purposes.  
•  Administrative efficiency and transparency is critical.  High compliance is essential.  
There should be an effective collection mechanism.  Claims should be processed and 
reimbursed efficiently. Procedures for disbursing funds should be clear and 
transparent (the Singapore Skills Development Fund and the Malaysian scheme are 
examples).  However, all schemes have significant non-compliance—over one-third 
of employers in Malaysia do not comply mainly because they find the regulations 
burdensome.  In countries with poor administrative capacity, non-compliance can be 
especially high, particularly among small businesses. 
•  Schemes should not crowd out non-governmental providers.  Crowding out has been 
observed in some countries, especially where revenues are directly channeled, if only 
partly, to public training institutions.  Government and non-government providers 
should compete on a level playing field for funds.  Competition should increase the 
effectiveness and efficiency of public institutions.  The government should ensure 
quality control among all training providers. Only providers (including public 
providers) of good quality and relevant training should be able to access funds. 
 
Source: Canagarajah, Dar and Murphy (2003) 
 
The Russian government should consider putting in place employer-targeted training 
policies to remedy the under-investment in in-service training.  In doing so, it can draw 
on the experiences of many other countries, both industrialized and developing, that have 
                                                 
28 Taiwan (China) and Singapore are two other East Asian economies that have successfully used direct 
reimbursement of approved training expenses, funded through payroll levies, to encourage firms to train 
their employees. The introduction of a training grant scheme in Taiwan (China) led to dramatic increases in 
training, which continued after the program ended in the 1970s.  Singapore used a levy on the wages of 
unskilled workers to finance training grants to employers to upgrade worker skills. The Skills Development 
Fund’s aggressive efforts to raise awareness of and direct training among firms led to a steady rise in 
training, especially among smaller firms. See Tan (2000) for an extended discussion of the Malaysian 
experience and an impact evaluation of the HRDF policy. 
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used a variety of policy interventions such as payroll-levy training funds, tax incentives 
for employer-sponsored training, and matching grants to address similar under-
investment in workforce skills.  Designing a training policy appropriate to Russia is 
beyond the scope of this chapter, but the global experience with training levies (see 
Middleton, Ziderman and Adams 1993; Gill, Fluitman and Dar 2000) suggests several 
lessons for the Government of Russia (see Box 7).  Essentially, they suggest: (a) that 
employers should be closely involved in the governance of levy funds, as in the cases of 
Argentina, Brazil and Chile which have vested supervision of levies in industrial bodies; 
(b) that policies be designed to increase competition in training provision from all 
providers, both public and private including the employer; and (c) that levy funds be 
strictly earmarked for training, and not diverted to other government uses as has 
happened with training levies in several Latin American and African countries. 
 
Although international evidence shows that levy schemes can have a positive impact by 
increasing training by enterprises, they are not without problems.  Levies have been 
inequitable in the sense that large employers have tended to benefit more from training 
levies than have small or medium-size employers.  Employer reactions to the schemes 
have also been mixed, with many firms, especially smaller businesses, feeling that a levy 
is simply another tax from which they rarely benefit. This may also be the response of 
many Russian firms that already face relatively high payroll taxes, unless they are 
reassured that funds earmarked for training are not diverted elsewhere, and that training 
funds are capably and transparently implemented. 
 
Training levies do not work particularly well for small and medium enterprises (SMEs), 
the group of enterprises in Russia that exhibited the lowest incidence and intensity of in-
service training.  The experiences of China, Malaysia, Brazil and Chile suggests that 
SME take-up of training policies in their countries are low, and that SME-targeted 
training programs are required to reach SMEs. Encouraging training in SMEs may 
require more proactive approaches to address systemic weaknesses in both training and 
technological capabilities and access to finance that most SMEs face. Mexico’s 
experience with SME training programs offers some lessons (see Box 8). 
 
An alternative is to use matching grants schemes, which can help to develop a training 
culture although, by themselves, they will not expand the training market.  The most 
successful matching grant schemes are demand-driven, implemented by the private 
sector, and aim to create sustained training markets.  Chile and Mauritius report positive 
results by using private agents to administer their schemes, and an increased investment 
in training matched by a reduction in enterprise failure.  A side benefit has been the 
development of a network of industry management training consultants who are available 
to enterprises that want to invest in enterprise-based training.  Singapore has a program to 
build up its stock of industry trainers, and Japan’s Industrial and Vocational Training 
Association has trained over 30,000 industry trainers in the past 30 years.  It is important 
to generate training capacity in enterprises and increase the propensity for workers to 
undertake training.  Grants should not be restricted to state-run training institutions. 
Funds should strengthen and diversify the supply of training and stimulate demand.     44
Strong training cultures have been established in Japan, Korea, and Singapore, much of 



































Whatever training policy is eventually adopted in Russia, it is imperative that enterprises 
and employer associations have meaningful inputs into the design of the policy so that the 
training system is responsive to their needs and those of other key stakeholders. Where 
warranted, industry could take joint responsibility with government for the management 
and delivery of training.  Brazil’s experience in this case is illustrative (see Box 9).  
 
At an institutional level, involving Russian employers in the management of individual 
vocational and technical institutes should help ensure a steady flow of information to 
these institutions of what skills are needed by local industry, as well as win-win 
opportunities for instructors to upgrade their knowledge and for studentes to be placed 
with employers.  The Indian Government is taking a similar approach is its efforts to 
Box 8.  Mexico’s Proactive Training Programs for SMEs 
 
The Integral Quality and Modernization Program (CIMO), established in 1988 by the 
Mexican Secretariat of Labor, has proved effective in serving small and medium-size 
enterprises (SMEs).  Set up initially to provide subsidized training, CIMO quickly evolved 
when it became apparent that lack of training was only one of many factors contributing to 
low productivity among SMEs.  By 2000 CIMO was providing an integrated package of 
training and industrial extension services to over 80,000 small and medium-size enterprises 
each year and training to 200,000 employees.  Private sector interest has grown, and more 
than 300 business associations now participate in CIMO, up from 72 in 1988.  
 
All states and the Federal District of Mexico have at least one CIMO unit, each staffed by 3-4 
promoters and housed in business associations which contribute office and support 
infrastructure. Promoters organize workshops on training and technical assistance services, 
identify potential local and regional training suppliers and consulting agents, both public and 
private, and actively seek out small and medium-size enterprises to deliver assistance on a 
cost-sharing, time-limited basis. They work with interested SMEs to conduct an initial 
diagnostic evaluation of the firm, as the basis for organizing training programs and other 
consulting and technical assistance.  The government does not deliver this training; instead, its 
role is to identify the most qualified local training providers, both public and private, that can 
deliver the training usually on a group or association basis so as to reduce unit training costs.  
This strategy is deliberate since one of the program’s objectives is to promote the 
development of regional training markets able to serve the needs of local enterprises. The 
CIMO program also targets industrial clusters, and works with large firms and their SME 
suppliers to organize and deliver cluster-specific training programs.  
 
Several rigorous evaluations have found CIMO to be a cost-effective way of assisting SMEs. 
While CIMO firms tended to have lower pre-program performance than a comparison group 
with similar attributes, their post-program outcome indicators tended to show relative 
improvements in key outcome indicators like labor productivity, capacity utilization, product 
quality, wages and employment. 
 
Source: Tan et al (2004).   45
reform the moribund public-sector Industrial Training Institutes (ITIs). It introduced 
Institutional Management Committees (IMCs) in 1998 to involve employers in 
overseeing ITI operations, and there are now 350 IMCs in 18 states with more in the 
pipeline.  IMCs are supported by the Confederation of Indian Industries (CII) and the 
Federation of Indian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (FICCI), with each IMC being 
chaired by a local industry representative.  As currently structured, however, IMCs have 
limited decision making powers because most states in India do not allow ITIs significant 
financial authority or incentives to revamp training offerings, or to retain student fees and 
other non-traditional sources of revenues from, for example, delivering tailored training 
courses to employers. 
 
Employers could also form public-private partnerships to deliver demand-driven, low 
cost training that is largely self-financing.  The case of Malaysia’s Penang Skills 
Development Centre is suggestive of how the private sector in different Russian regions 
can partner with state governments in the reform and management of tertiary-level 
professional and technical institutes (see Box 10).  
 
 
Box 9.  Employer-Owned and Managed Training in Brazil 
 
Experiences in Brazil underscore the importance of ownership and employer participation.  A 
chronic gulf between supply and demand was bridged by giving control of training to its users.  
The National Industrial Apprenticeship Service (Serviço Nacional de Aprendizage Industrial 
[SENAI]) was created in the 1940s and operates under the ownership of the Federation of 
Industries.  SENAI was followed by four other sector-specific services: commerce (SENAC), 
rural areas (SENAR), small enterprises (SEBRAE), and transport (SENAT).  All the services 
operate under the same basic structure and legal framework.  Chambers of employers finance 
their training programs through a one percent payroll levy and run the services with full 
independence and under private sector statutes.  
 
The five services have evolved in different directions although they operate with the same rules 
and legal framework.  SENAI has a network of 500 training institutions and trains two million 
workers a year.  SENAR and SEBRAE were first created as government bureaucracies but this 
led to inefficiencies, lack of responsiveness and flexibility, and to political spoils.  They were 
recreated with ownership, management, and budgets given to the relevant employer associations.  
Because training markets had already been developed in the country, the rejuvenated SENAR and 
SEBRAE opted to buy training in the market rather than to establish their own training 
institutions.  SENAT, the newest service, took a different path.  It created an extensive satellite 
network for training employees of more than 1,000 firms throughout the country. 
Source:  Inter American Development Bank, IADB (2005) 
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Box 10.  Industry-Government Cooperation:  
The case of the Penang Skills Development Centre (PSDC) 
 
The Penang Skills Development Centre (PSDC) is a joint company training centre established with 
government support.  It has evolved to become a full private further education institution providing 
certificate and diploma level training.  The Malaysian Government invests in the Centre and uses it 
to carry out public training programs.  It demonstrates the potential of private education and 
training institutions being used for public training purposes where these are not viable in 
themselves as private commercial undertakings, and without creating the facilities in the public 
sector. PSDC, with more than 100 member companies, runs both standardized and customized 
programs.  It charges at cost and is basically self-financing.  Companies recoup the expenditure 
from the Human Resource Development Fund (HRDF), a training fund financed by a 1 percent 
levy on payrolls. 
 
The initiative for PSDC came from the Penang State Government.  The State provided the land 
and buildings. The founder members included large multinational companies with training 
traditions of their own.  Members donate equipment, laboratories, training modules and trainers.  
They have access to shared training facilities without having to duplicate with their own in-house 
capability.  SMEs enjoy technology transfer from and can benchmark their standards against 
multinationals.  Multinationals, in turn, receive better support services.  Vendors donate equipment 
to familiarize the company workforce with their products and promote sales. 
 
While still a joint-training centre, the PSDC has taken on institutional functions to provide training 
for school-leavers and has moved to become a professional training entity in its own right.  None 
of this is to say that the PSDC is easily replicated.  Eleven other Malaysian States (out of 13) have 
launched similar centers, with varying degrees of success, usually a function of state government 
commitment, regional growth, and private sector ingenuity (the State of Johor invited equipment 
suppliers in the stock and update equipment used in the JDC, so training equipment was always 
current and comparable to those used in companies). As usual, the success of this sort of enterprise 
depends on a number of circumstances, most importantly the people initiating and managing the 
process.  Centers like PSDC cannot be imposed; they need to grow in already fertile ground. 
 
Source:  Pillay (2005) 
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Annex 1. 
 
Estimating the Productivity and Wage Effects of Endogenous Training 
 
Thus far, the production function and wage models have been estimated by simple 
regression methods that assume implicitly that training is exogenously given.  If the firms 
that choose to train differ systematically from those that do not (in their underlying 
productivity), then simple estimates of the productivity (or wage) outcomes of training 
may be biased. To address this potential problem, a two-stage “treatment effects” model 
is used where the endogenous training decision and training outcomes are estimated 
jointly.  In this model, any in-service training is predicted from a first-stage auxiliary 
training equation
29 and its predicted value included in the second-stage production 
function or wage model.
30   
 
In-service training continues to be associated with positive productivity and wage 
outcomes when account is taken of the endogenous training choice.  In results not 
reported here, the selectivity-corrected training variable continues to be positively 
associated with productivity and wages (significant at either the 5 or 10 percent levels).
31  
Simulations using the estimated coefficients suggest that, for a representative firm (with 
the sample means for all variables), in-service training increases productivity levels by 6 
percent and monthly wages by 9 percent.  These findings, though supportive of the 
hypothesized positive training-productivity and training-wage links, should nonetheless 
be treated with caution and not be interpreted as being causal (panel data are needed to 
establish causality).  However, several panel studies for industrialized and developing 
countries have found empirical evidence that training leads to improved future firm 
performance and higher wages.
32    
 
                                                 
29 The training equation uses the same model specification as that used in the incidence of training results 
reported in Table 5. 
30 This two-stage procedure requires that instrumental variables be found to identify the training and 
outcome equations. When training involves multiple choices, such as the decision of whether to train in-
house or to get training from external sources, the estimation increasingly becomes empirically intractable.  
As such, production function and wage model estimates for other training measures continue to rely on 
simple OLS regressions. 
31 The two-stage procedure leads to increases in the estimated coefficients of training that seem, on the 
surface, to be implausibly large. Other training studies report similar findings when attempting to control 
for selection bias in training decisions (see Dearden, Reed and Van Reenen, 2000). A more reasonable way 
to interpret the results is through simulations of predicted outcomes with and without training. 
32 Panel studies, based on longitudinal firm surveys that elicited repeated information on the training 
practices of the same firms, have found evidence that training, especially when it is repeated, leads to 
higher productivity growth and wages (see Dearden, Reed and Van Reenen 2000 for Britain; Tan 2000 for 
Malaysia; Tan and Lopez-Acevedo 2003 for Mexico). 